

Insights from the UK's Commissioning Better **Outcomes Evaluation** 

> **Engaging with Evidence Session 13** 19 October 2022



Evidence



## About the Government Outcomes Lab (GO Lab)







#### Established in 2016

#### Partnership between UK Government & University of Oxford

We investigate government's role in unlocking fruitful <u>cross-sector</u> <u>partnerships to improve social</u> <u>outcomes</u>

# Welcome to the thirteenth session of the Engaging with Evidence series



An open platform for policymakers, practitioners and researchers around the world to engage with key findings from the latest research and evaluation work in the field

- Distillation of key research findings
- Practical insights from practitioners across different sectors and fields
- Honest and constructive dialogue

For the next edition of Engaging with Evidence

Final Results of the Quality Education India Development Impact Bond

8 December 2022. 1pm - 2.30pm GMT https://bsg.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJlodOu urzwiH9F4fx\_F6HmquZyvihA\_N3Ny





Engaging with Evidence Webinar series **Engaging with Evidence** *Webinar series* 



#### Insights from the UK's Commissioning Better Outcomes Evaluation

In today's session:

Part I - Highlights from the Report

Overview of the Commissioning Better Outcomes Fund The CBO Third Evaluation Report

Part II - Panel discussion

Discussion around three core SIB themes:

- 1. Design: How SIBs can vary in design, and the need to align their design to one's aim.
- 2. Delivery: The factors that influence delivery of SIB projects
- 3. Impact: The emerging evidence on the benefits of using a SIB model

#### Speakers



Philip Messere The National Lottery Community Fund

1251

**Chris Drinkwater** 

Ways to Wellness





James Ronicle Ecorys

Neil Stanworth ATQ Consultants

Eleanor Carter The GO Lab

#### Moderators





Andreea Anastasiu The GO Lab Ernesto Oyarbide-Magaña The GO Lab



## Our audience this morning







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#### Context setting: The Commissioning Better Outcomes Fund

Philip Messere - Funding Manager at the National Lottery Community Fund

## CBO SIBs (& OBCs)

- £40m lottery funded programme launched in 2013
- England Health, Educ., Environment and charitable
- Test & learn programme what works/what doesn't
- Aim: to grow the market in SIBs and other OBCs

#### 4 Objectives:

- Commissioner engagement and upskilling
- Early intervention for least able to access services
- New investment to fund (primarily VCSE) delivery
- Impactful Learning by evaluation & shared learning



## CBO SIBs (& OBCs)

- 24 full awards to projects
- 271K People engaged in services delivered
- 190 VCSE engaged with 92 paid mainly for delivery
- 54 commissioners have paid for outcomes
- 9 retail investors main 3: Bridges, C&W, BII
- Policy areas
  - Health (9), Social Care (8), Employment (5), Youth (2)
- Geography
  - London 10, Midlands 4, South West 4, North 4, South East 2



## SIBs can serve multiple purposes

- Help VCSEs engage with PbR contracts
- Build cross-sector relationships:
- Reduce financial dependency on TNLCF
- Create learning
- Strengthen VCSE resilience
- Innovation interventions trialled
- Generate income to all stakeholders where successful











#### Key findings from the Commissioning Better Outcomes Third Update Report

James Ronicle - Director at Ecorys UK

Neil Stanworth - Founding Director at ATQ Consultants











## CBO Evaluation: Update Report 3

James Ronicle & Neil Stanworth GO Lab Engaging with Evidence Session, 19/10/22

# Overview

- Introduction: Commissioning Better Outcomes Fund Evaluation
- Part 1: SIBs The Metamorphosis: Comparative analysis of nine SIB models
- Part 2: CBO performance 2014-2018
- Part 3: Benefits and disadvantages of SIB model











Introduction: Commissioning Better Outcomes Evaluation



## **Commissioning Better Outcomes Programme**

- Funded by The National Lottery Community Fund
- Outcomes Fund: Provides up to £40m to provide 'top up' outcome payments to locally-commissioned SIBs & other outcomes-based contracts
- Funding from 2013 2024
- Funded 21 projects





## **Commissioning Better Outcomes Programme**

#### **Policy sector**



- Health
- Child and family welfare
- Education
- Employment and training
- Homelessness

#### Stage of development





### **CBO Evaluation**

- Advantages and disadvantages of commissioning a service through a SIB model; the overall added value of using a SIB model; and how this varies in different contexts
- Challenges in developing SIBs and how these could be overcome
- The extent to which CBO has met its aim of growing the SIB market in order to enable more people, particularly those most in need, to lead fulfilling lives, in enriching places and as part of successful communities. It also explores what more The Community Fund and other stakeholders could do to meet this aim.













Part 1:SIBs – The Metamorphosis: Comparative analysis of nine SIB models



## Aim

- To objectively 'map' different SIB models, and compare their development against their origina conception
- 2 frameworks as starting point:
  - GO Lab SIB dimensions
  - SIB original concept (Fraser et al)



#### **SIB** original concept

An innovative partnership between private and/or socially minded investors, commissioners and non-profit service providers, often coordinated through SIB specialist organisations, to tackle deeply ingrained social problems

Improved social outcomes for service users and cashable savings for commissioners;

Financial risk transfer from the public sector to investors; rigorous evaluation to ensure that improvements in social outcomes are measured and attributable to the SIBfinanced interventions; and

Return on investment to investors dependent on achievement of outcomes.



Finding: Some of the original concepts have 'held true', others less so

- **Payment based on outcomes:** Two-thirds of the families attach 100% of payments to outcomes. In 3 commissioners also
- Validation approach: Only 3 estimate attribution in payments
- Shielding provider from financial risk: In majority (5) provider is fully shielded. Out of other 4, in 3 provider paid on engagements; in 1 have to repay loan if under-performance
- VCSE delivery: All in-part had VCSE delivery, though public sector organisations also involved
- **Performance management:** More performance management in all. In most (5) done by external organisation
- **Invest to save:** Most have strong invest-to-save focus, though in only 1/3 is this built into payment model



Average CBO in-depth review family



### But they're all different....



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VCSEs are involved.

Figure 2.5: SIB dimensions for each of the CBO in-depth review families at launch



## Their 'shape' is affected by a wide range of different factors

It is important to be aware of the different SIB 'shapes', and be sure you are designing your SIB shape to suit your own context



Source: Ecorys & ATQ (forthcoming). CBO Evaluation: 3rd Update Report

# Is this a good or a bad thing?

- We would say good thing: Taking the original concept and adapting it to different contexts
- But important the SIB 'shape' is actively debated and designed to suit stakeholder needs
- Need an update on the SIB narrative: What they are and what they are for

| SIB original concept   | SIB reality  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| An innovative partnership between private<br>and/or socially minded investors, commissioners<br>and non-profit service providers, often<br>coordinated through SIB specialist organisations,<br>to tackle deeply ingrained social problems | An innovative partnership between primarily<br>socially-minded investors, commissioners and<br>non-profit organisations, often coordinated<br>through SIB specialist organisations, using their<br>different skillsets and ability to use their funding in<br>different ways to tackle deeply ingrained social<br>problems |  |  |  |
| mproved social outcomes for service users and cashable savings for commissioners   | Improved social outcomes for service users, which<br>are likely to reduce future costs to the public<br>sector (though not necessarily the commissioner)<br>and may in some cases produce cashable savings   |  |  |  |
| Financial risk transfer from the public sector to nvestors   | A sharing of financial risk between the public sector, voluntary sector and investors  |  |  |  |
| Rigorous evaluation to ensure that<br>mprovements in social outcomes are measured<br>and attributable to the SIB-financed<br>nterventions  | Higher standard of outcome measurement than is typically seen in fee-for-service contracts   |  |  |  |
| Return on investment to investors dependent on achievement of outcomes   | Return on investment to investors dependent on<br>provider performance, including ability to engage<br>service users and achieve outcomes  |  |  |  |













Part 2: CBO performance 2014-2018



## **CBO performance**

- Performance generally lower than originally expected
- Mainly because of lower referrals, which in turn affects outcomes
- Unrealistic

   forecasting or underdelivery? Most is
   unrealistic
   forecasting due to
   optimism bias













Part 3: Benefits and disadvantages of SIB Model



## **Basis of analysis**

- Performance and characteristics of projects on which we had completed a second (mid-point) review
- Three published reviews (Ways to Wellness, MHEP, West London Zone)
- Two unpublished reviews where we had completed most or all qualitative fieldwork
- Detailed analysis of issues from process evaluation
- Overall summary in RAG form



## Main benefits of SIB/SOC model

- "Better" performance management due to:
  - Specific funding of an enhanced level of performance management
  - The incentive to greater and more regular scrutiny of performance that comes from a focus on outcomes
- Improved application of data and systems
- Flexibility to:
  - adapt delivery to user needs
  - renegotiate and change contract terms
- Outcomes focus and culture among providers
- Greater social impact



Strong evidenceSome evidenceLittle/no evidence

| Benefit               | W2W | MHEP | WLZ | Project 4 | Project 5 |
|-----------------------|-----|------|-----|-----------|-----------|
| Funded<br>external PM |     |      |     |           |           |
| Data and systems      |     |      |     |           |           |
| Flexibility           |     |      |     |           |           |
| Outcomes<br>culture   |     |      |     |           |           |
| Greater<br>impact     |     |      |     |           |           |

## Main disadvantages of SIB/SOC model

- Underperformance creates tension between stakeholders
  - Especially between investor and provider
- Overestimation of performance in business cases
  - Consistent optimism bias

ECORYS

- Applies more to referrals/user engagements than outcomes
- Adverse implications of risk-bearing by contract parties
  - For providers whose funding links to outputs or outcomes
  - For commissioners who are asked to pay more or more up front than first promised
- Commissioner engagement challenges
  - From management churn
  - From reorganisation

## Main disadvantages of SIB/SOC model

Some evidence

Little/no evidence

Strong evidence

| Benefit                    | W2W | MHEP | WLZ | Project 4 | Project 5 |
|----------------------------|-----|------|-----|-----------|-----------|
| Tension                    |     |      |     |           |           |
| Optimism bias              |     |      |     |           |           |
| Provider risk              |     |      |     |           |           |
| Commissioner<br>risk       |     |      |     |           |           |
| Commissioner<br>engagement |     |      |     |           |           |



## Conclusions



## SIBs come in many different shapes and sizes, and it is important their design aligns to the policy objective

Social impact bonds have evolved away from their original concept. We see this is a good thing, as they have been adapted to suit different concepts. However, it is important that people are aware of what they're buying: That they don't think they have a 'textbook' SIB when in reality they don't.



## It is important that assumptions are robustly tested during the design stage:

The CBO projects have had varied success against their original outcome projections. This is largely because their designs had high levels of optimism bias, often because the SIB design was being 'sold' to either local commissioners or TNCLF. It is important that assumptions are robustly tested during the design stage



Stakeholders in the projects we have reviewed were of the view that they achieved more outcomes, and greater social impact

This is due to stronger performance management that was built into the SIB mechanism, and the impetus provided by linking payment to outcomes. It is arguable that better and stronger performance management could be funded and built into any contract, but the evidence suggests that it tends not to be. It remains, however, challenging to prove objectively that a SIB works better than a conventional contract

## Panel Discussion





**Ecorys** 

**ATQ Consultants** 



- **Design:** How SIBs can vary in design, and the • need to align their design to one's aim.
- **Delivery:** The factors that influence delivery of • SIB projects
- **Impact:** The emerging evidence on the benefits • of using a SIB model

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## CBO Progress to date

- 24 projects (target 20) 1<sup>st</sup> Birmingham 2014
- 267K service users achieved outcomes
- £83m savings achieved
- £32m delivery contract costs (88% costs)
- £34.6m outcomes payments (77% plan)
- £14.4m invested by 9 investors incl. 3 VCSEs
- SIB income equals SIB spend across programme
- CBO 24% all outcomes paid to June 22
- CBO extended to 31/3/24 to allow 7 projects to run for up to an extra year to offset impact of Covid







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