

Understanding the DIB effect. Insights from the evaluation of the FCDO Development Impact Bonds Pilot Programmes

Engaging with Evidence Session 20 2 November 2023





The Government Outcomes Lab (GO Lab)





Welcome to the twentieth session of the Engaging with Evidence series



An open platform for policymakers, practitioners and researchers around the world to engage with key findings from the latest research and evaluation work in the field

- Distillation of key research findings
- Practical insights from practitioners across different sectors and fields
- Honest and constructive dialogue



Sign up to our monthly newsletter



Engaging with Evidence Webinar series Engaging with Evidence Webinar series



Understanding the DIB effect. Insights from the evaluation of the FCDO Development Impact Bonds Pilot Programmes

In today's session:

Part I - Overview of the findings from the third wave of the Independent Evaluation of the FCDO Development Impact Bonds Pilot Programme

 Jemima Hodkinson from Foreign Commonwealth Development Office will share an overview of FCDO DIBs Pilot Programme. James Ronicle from Ecorys will share insights and key learning from the evaluation.

Part II - Panel discussion: wider learning for the sector

 In the panel discussion, we will explore with development experts and those involved directly in the programmes the wider implications of the evaluation findings and how the lessons can help inform future design and delivery of outcomes-focused programmes for development more broadly.

Speakers







Milena Castellnou

Education Outcomes

Fund



James Ronicle Ecorys



Ali Inam Bridges Outcomes Partnership



Celeste Brubaker Village Enterprise

Moderators



Dr Mara Airoldi GO Lab



Srinithya Nagarajan GO Lab



Our audience this morning















Part I - Overview of the findings from the third wave of the Independent Evaluation of the FCDO DIBs Pilot Programme

Jemima Hodkinson, Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO) James Ronicle, Ecorys



Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

The Development Impact Bonds Pilot Programme

Jemima Hodkinson Private Sector and Capital Markets Department

November 2023

Outcomes-based financing in the FCDO



8

The Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) Pilot Programme

- Objective: to build evidence on the suitability and cost-effectiveness of DIBs as a tool for financing international development programmes
- Three pilot projects... and an evaluation



What role does the DIB model play in driving programme performance and results?

Where is it most appropriate?

How can we increase its benefits / reduce transaction costs?

9

FCDO DIB programme evaluation



Understanding the DIB Effect Insights from the FCDO DIBs Pilot Programme



Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

Introduction: The FCDO DIBs Programme & Evaluation

ECORYS 🔶 Answering tomorrow's challenges today & Development Offi

The FCDO DIBs pilot programme ran from June 2017-March 2023, allocating £6.3 million to the following 3 projects:

International Committee of the Red Cross Humanitarian Impact Bond for Physical Rehabilitation, which funded three new physical rehabilitation centres in Mali, Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).



India development impact bond which aimed to improve education outcomes for primary schoolaged children in India.

Village Enterprise micro-enterprise poverty graduation impact bond which aimed to raise the income levels of the extreme poor.



The evaluation also covered the Cameroon Cataract Bond, which funds cataract surgeries.



What is a DIB?

A DIB is a mechanism for drawing external finance into payment-by-results (PbR) projects.

- A donor commits to paying for development results if and when they are achieved.
- A service provider steps up to deliver the prescribed results. Investors provide the upfront finance needed to deliver.
- The investor takes on some financial risk if development results are not achieved.

They are similar to social impact bonds (SIBs); in a SIB the outcome payer is the host government; in a DIB it is a donor





 Investors: 9 investors, including Delta Fund. Provide \$3.25m working capital

- Service provider: Village Enterprise
- Intervention: Support for micro-business growth to 12,600 extreme poor households in Kenya & Uganda
- Outcome payers: FCDO, USAID & anonymous donor. Pay \$1 to VE for every \$1 increase in household consumption
- Outcome payments used to repay loan, with interest



Generate learnings and recommendations on the use of DIBs as an instrument for aid delivery to inform FCDO's future policy on DIBs.

Evaluation questions:



How does the DIB model affect the design, delivery, performance and effectiveness of development interventions?



associated transaction

costs?

Evaluation approach

Focus of the evaluation: The 'DIB effect', that is, the effect of using a DIB instead of a grant or other PbR mechanism.

Our approach: We used a combination of process tracing and comparative analysis, comparing the DIBs against comparable projects to isolate the 'DIB effect'.

Evidence base:

Interviews, programme document review, cost data and monitoring data across the three DIBs as well as at the sector level.

Evaluation Key findings



	ICRC HIB	QEI	VE
Outcome achievement:	9% improvement in staff efficiency as compared to baseline	Participating schools achieved 2.5x more learning outcomes than non-participating schools	RCT showed monthly consumption and net assets were 6.3% and 5.8% higher respectively in VE participating villages than control villages
Outcome payments committed:	26.1M CHF	\$9.2M	\$4.3M
Outcome payments paid:	18.6M CHF	\$7.8M	\$4.3M
Investment committed:	18.6M CHF	\$3M	\$2.3M
Investment return	All capital, no interest	8%	Initial capital + \$730K

The DIB effects: Summary of findings

Transfer of fisk Image: Construct of Constructs of Construct on Construct of Construct on C	Design DIB Effects	Summary	ICRC	QEI	VE
Increased reputational risks resulting from the use of the DIB Pattnerships More service providers entering into PDR contracts due to pre- financing and funding Funding projects which would not have been funded otherwise, or not in the same guise Additional financing to the development sector Longer term funding Design Enables innovation More careful and rigorous design of interventions Complex to design and expensive to set up Delivery DIB Effects Summary ICRC QEI VE Positive DIB Effects Negative DIB Effect Cherry picking of participants from target population Quality of support reduced Tunnel vision Lowers staff morale Greater Outcomes Spillover Effects Summary ICRC QEI VE Coganisation Level Rolling out of processes and learning Increased visibility Diverting of attention Ecosystem Level Capacity strengthening to deliver DIBs Increased stakeholder interest in DIBs	Transfer of risk				
Partnerships Image: Service providers entering into PbR contracts due to pre-financing and transfer of risk Funding projects which would not have been funded otherwise, or not in the same guise Image: Service Providers entering Additional financing to the development sector Image: Service Providers entering Longer term funding Image: Service Providers entering Design Image: Service Providers entering Enables innovation Image: Service Providers entering More careful and rigorous design of interventions Image: Service Providers entering Complex to design and expensive to set up Image: Service Providers entering Delivery DIB Effects Summary ICRC Positive DIB Effects Summary ICRC Shift focus to outcomes and greater accountability Image: Service Providers entering Image: Service Providers entering Providers deliver adaptive management Providers entering Image: Service Providers entering Image: Service Providers entering Negative DIB Effects Image: Service Providers entering Image: Service Providers entering Image: Service Providers entering Cherry picking of participants from target population Image: Service Providers entering Image: Service Providers entering Image: Service Providers entervice Provice Providers e	Transfer of financial risk from outcome funder to investor				
More service providers entering into PbR contracts due to pre- financing and transfer of risk Financing and funding Finding projects which would not have been funded otherwise, or not in the same guise Additional financing to the development sector Longer term funding Design Design Design Delivery DIB effects Summary ICRC QEI VE Positive DIB Effects Summary ICRC QEI VE Positive DIB Effect Cherry picking of participants from target population Greater collaboration between stakeholders Negative DIB Effect Cherry picking of participants from target population Quality of support reduced Tunnel vision Lowers staff morale Greater Outcomes Increased efficiency and effectiveness, leading to more outcomes Spillover Effects Summary ICRC QEI VE Corganisation Level Capacity strengthening to deliver DIBs Increased stakeholder interest in DIBs	Increased reputational risks resulting from the use of the DIB				
financing and transfer of risk Financing and funding Funding projects which would not have been funded otherwise, or not in the same guise Additional financing to the development sector Longer term funding Design Comper term funding Complex to design of interventions Complex to design and expensive to set up Complex to design and expensive to cources correction, supporting innovation Complex to	Partnerships				
Funding projects which would not have been funded otherwise, or not in the same guise Image: Complex complex complex complex complex complex to design of interventions Additional financing to the development sector Image: Complex complex complex complex complex to design of interventions Complex to design and expensive to set up Image: Complex complex complex complex complex to design and expensive to set up Delivery DIB Effects Summary ICRC QEI VE Positive DIB Effects Image: Complex comple					
not in the same guiseImage: Constraint of the development sectorImage: Constraint of the development sectorLonger term fundingImage: Constraint of the development sectorImage: Constraint of the development sectorLonger term fundingImage: Constraint of the development sectorImage: Constraint of the development sectorLonger term fundingImage: Constraint of the development sectorImage: Constraint of the development sectorComplex to design and expensive to set upImage: Constraint of the development sectorImage: Constraint of the development sectorDelivery DIB EffectsImage: Constraint of the development	Financing and funding				
Longer term fundingImage: Constraint of the second sec		٠			
Design Image: Constraint of the end of the	Additional financing to the development sector	•			
Enables innovationImage: Complex to design and expensive to set upImage: Complex to design and expensive to set upImage: Complex to design and expensive to set upDelivery DIB EffectsSummaryICRCQEIVEPositive DIB EffectsImage: Complex to outcomes and greater accountabilityImage: Complex to outcomes and greater accountabilityImage: Complex to design and expensive to accountabilityImage: Complex to outcomes and greater accountabilityImage: Complex to outcomes to outcomes and greater accountabilityImage: Complex to outcomes to outcomes and greater accountabilityImage: Complex to outcomes to outcomes to outcomesImage: Complex to outcomes	Longer term funding	•			
More careful and rigorous design of interventions Complex to design and expensive to set upImage: constraint of the set of th	Design				
Complex to design and expensive to set upImage: state	Enables innovation	•			
Delivery DIB EffectsSummaryICRCQEIVEPositive DIB EffectsIIIShift focus to outcomes and greater accountabilityImage: Comparison of the second sec	More careful and rigorous design of interventions	•			
Positive DIB EffectsItem of the second s	Complex to design and expensive to set up				
Shift focus to outcomes and greater accountability Image: Comparison of the second	Delivery DIB Effects	Summary	ICRC	QEI	VE
Drives performance managementImage and course correction, supporting innovationImage and course correction, supporting innovationImage and course correction, supporting innovationImage and course correction, 	Positive DIB Effects				
Providers deliver adaptive management and course correction, supporting innovationImage: Constant of the second s	Shift focus to outcomes and greater accountability				
supporting innovationImage: supporting innovationImage: support in general	Drives performance management	_			
Negative DIB EffectImage: Comparison of the sector of the sec			•		
Cherry picking of participants from target population Image: Cherry picking of participants from target population Quality of support reduced Image: Cherry picking of participants from target population Tunnel vision Image: Cherry picking of participants from target population Lowers staff morale Image: Cherry picking of participants from target population Greater Outcomes Image: Cherry picking of participants from target population Increased efficiency and effectiveness, leading to more outcomes Image: Cherry picking of participants from target population Spillover Effects Summary ICRC QEI VE Organisation Level Image: Cherry picking of attention Image: Cherry picking of attention Image: Cherry picking of attention Image: Cherry picking of population Image: Chery picking of population Image: Cherry picking of po	Greater collaboration between stakeholders	a			
Quality of support reducedImage: Constraint of the second of	Negative DIB Effect				
Tunnel visionImage: Constraint of the second se	Cherry picking of participants from target population				
Lowers staff moraleImage: Constraint of the staff moral of the s	Quality of support reduced				
Greater OutcomesIncreased efficiency and effectiveness, leading to more outcomesImage: Comparison of the sector of the sec	Tunnel vision				
Increased efficiency and effectiveness, leading to more outcomesImage: Constraint of the sector of the	Lowers staff morale	e	_		
Spillover EffectsSummaryICRCQEIVEOrganisation LevelICRCQEIVERolling out of processes and learningICRCICRCICRCIncreased visibilityICRCICRCICRCDiverting of attentionICRCICRCICRCEcosystem LevelICRCICRCICRCCapacity strengthening to deliver DIBsICRCICRCICRCIncreased stakeholder interest in DIBsICRCICRCICRC	Greater Outcomes				
Organisation Level Image: Constraint of the second sec	Increased efficiency and effectiveness, leading to more outcomes				
Rolling out of processes and learning Increased visibility Increased visibili	Spillover Effects	Summary	ICRC	QEI	VE
Increased visibility Image: Comparison of attention Image: Comparison of attenting attentinge: Comparison of attention Image: Comp	Organisation Level				
Diverting of attention Image: Comparison of the second s	Rolling out of processes and learning	e			
Ecosystem Level Image: Capacity strengthening to deliver DIBs Image: Capacity strengthening to deliver DIBs Increased stakeholder interest in DIBs Image: Capacity strengthening to deliver DIBs Image: Capacity strengthening to deliver DIBs	Increased visibility				
Capacity strengthening to deliver DIBs	Diverting of attention	0			
Increased stakeholder interest in DIBs	Ecosystem Level				
	Capacity strengthening to deliver DIBs				
Contributions to the evidence base	Increased stakeholder interest in DIBs	•			
	Contributions to the evidence base				

The DIB effect summarised



Examples of 'DIB effects' across the DIBs

ECORYS 🚔 Answering tomorrow's challenges today

Stronger focus on outcomes

"I don't believe this DIB suddenly made [VE] into a learning organisation. I think they were a learning organisation that were held back by existing contracts. **[The DIB] made them unfettered to be a fully learning organisation** [...] it removed their shackles." Investor, Village Enterprise

Heightened performance management; external perspectives

"Our monitoring and evaluation system was already in place. However, Dalberg works very closelv with us and became an integral part of the team's sharing and learning process. We meet quarterly to map, discuss, and address any challenges. This is all reflected in the planning sheet. They adopt a collaborative approach that helps, and a thirdparty perspective helps, as the team might miss out on something if they tend to always act in the same way by default." Service provider, Quality **Education India**

High-stakes environment

"We had to obtain impact under the DIB by any means." Village Enterprise

Spillover effects

- ICRC HIB: Efficiency Improvement Measures introduced as part of HIB rolled out across ICRC physical rehabilitation facilities
- QEI: MIS data analysis & use; performance tracking & quarterly reporting systems rolled out across service provider organisations
- Village Enterprise: Cultural shift towards more outcomes-focused approaches; adaptive management system in DIB rolled out across organisation

ECORYS 🔶 Answering the morrows challenges today & Development Office

Emerging evidence is that DIBs are an effective 'change management' tool. And so a DIB may be most appropriate where:



Performance could be enhanced through a stronger focus on outcomes buttressed by performance management

The system/culture needs an external 'disruption' to bring about change

Service providers would not be able to tolerate high levels of financial risk

Providers would benefit from external expertise and support

DIB costs

- Operating the projects through a DIB required additional costs compared to funding them through grants
- The additional DIB cost ranged between \$1.8m-\$2.3m
- This ranged from 9% to 42% of the total programme budget
- Across the DIBs, the highest costs were in the areas of investor return, verification, and performance management
- Generally, stakeholders perceived the additional costs to be value for money.



Lessons learnt from implementing pilot Development Impact Bonds

02



í Br

Eo

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

ĥ

ΔİΔ

What are Development Impact Bonds, and what do they achieve? Findings from the third and final wave of the FCDO DIBs evaluation undertaken by Ecorys highlighted key lessons learnt from three FCDO-funded DIB pilot projects.

03

benefit.



Additional stakeholders do result in greater coordination and communication costs. The role of the intermediary should be carefully considered, to ensure costs and benefits are proportionate.

Î

8

The use of validated administrative data versus experimental approaches should be guided by the policy objectives of the DIB and the geographical/sector context. A more pragmatic approach could bring down evaluation costs and support scalability of future DIBs but will diminish the quality of the evidence produced and may diminish some of the DIB effects. There may also be potential in further aligning the verification and performance

ilil

Additional investment in performance management was a valuable component of the pilot DIBs and should be integrated into future DIBs where necessary to increase the model's

Measuring costeffectiveness is extremely challenging. We would encourage donors to stipulate financial reporting requirements within funding agreements.

04

Appropriate service provider capacity-building should be embedded into the DIB. Peer-learning may be an effective and costefficient way of supporting this.

05

06

It is important to balance the 'black box' commissioning approach of an impact bond with ensuring minimum quality standards – such as adequate safeguarding policies – are in place.



activities, to reduce costs and

maximise benefits.

Emergency situations should be accounted for within contracting. Additional scenario-testing during the design and setup phase to plan for and accommodate risk could be one way to address this. 80

Striking a balance between complexity and usability for outcome payment formulas is key. Complex metrics and outcome payment formulas could create scalability and replicability challenges. 09

A large amount of the 'additional costs' of a DIB are incurred during the design phase. This is a good sign, as replication may reduce these costs if DIBs continue to be designed and delivered.



Additional DIB costs do not increase in relation to the scale of the DIB. This suggests there are economies of scale in running larger DIBs.

Reflecting on the FCDO DIB pilots

Possible next steps for the DIBs model

The evaluation of the FCDO DIBs Pilot found that stakeholders were broadly positive about the benefits of launching projects through DIBs. Whilst stakeholders through the DIB costs were value for money, they also thought the model could be streamlined. We think this could be achieved in the following ways:

263

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

Answering tomorrow's challenges today

ECORYS 🚔



Conclusions



The DIB pilots were **successful** in meeting their aims and objectives of the programme (of testing a new funding mechanism; building stronger relationships with the private sector; and galvanizing service providers)





The DIB mechanism is therefore a 'change management tool' that is applicable when outcomes could be stronger, and a disruption is required to bring about change



Whilst stakeholders were broadly positive of the benefits and VfM of the DIB mechanism, most felt it could be **streamlined**



The key question for the future is: Can you achieve an outcomes focus and high-stakes environment through a **simpler structure**? There are a number of options here that require further testing



Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

How FCDO have used the findings of the evaluation?

Jemima Hodkinson Private Sector and Capital Markets Department

November 2023

Lessons: from Development Impact Bonds to the Pioneer Outcomes Fund

Evidence base	 Pioneer Outcomes Fund launched in 2019 – building on evidence for the first cycle of evaluation of the DIBs
Economies of scale	 Education Outcomes Fund (EOF) projects pool funds from various outcomes payers/investors
Outcome verification	 EOF projects use a blend of activity-based and outcomes-based payments, and a small number of indicators, to reduce costs Invested time/resource in pricing outcomes during design Quality of outcome verification identified as a key risk
Developing the ecosystem	 Knowledge Hub – Government Outcomes Lab Outcomes Accelerator Outcomes Financing Alliance Building capacity of other organisations? Evidence gaps?

....and beyond

Internal challenges to wider use	 Adapting finance and commercial approaches Building understanding and capability 	
Sectors to explore	 Fragile and conflict-affected settings Climate / environment / energy transition Humanitarian 	



Panel Discussion





Jemima Hodkinson Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)



Milena Castellnou Education Outcomes Fund

James Ronicle Ecorys



Ali Inam Bridges Outcomes Partnership



Celeste Brubaker Village Enterprise

Part II - Panel discussion: wider learning and relevance for the sector

- Value added by using a Development Impact Bond (DIB) model
- Role of various stakeholders
- Collaboration and peer learning between stakeholders
- Sustainability and system strengthening effects

Engaging with Evidence Webinar series

Stay tuned for upcoming sessions...





Engaging with Evidence Webinar series

#EngagingwithEvidence