BLAVATNIK SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

3-4 SEPTEMBER

SOCIAL OUTCOMES CONFERENCE 2026

Welcome to the 9th edition of the Social Outcomes Conference

#SOC26

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EVENT BEGINS SHORTLY 90

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SOC26 at a glance

8 Roundtables and workshops

8 Spotlight sessions

6 Croissants & collaborations

4 Deep dives

3 Plenary sessions

1 Social impact poster gallery

1 Academic paper writing workshop

94+ speakers from around the world

500+ participants in person and online







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GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

DAY I - Spotlight sessions (11:45-12:45)

FIRST FLOOR

01 

Delivering basic income and personalised budget programmes in Wales: from evidence to implementation

Location: Executive Seminar Room

Session leads: Jonathan Tan (Greater Change), Micael Sanders (King's College London), Mark Drakeford (Independent)

02 

Motivating the health workforce in times of reduced financing: unlocking the potential of performance-based financing (PBF) in Ethiopia

Location: Group Working Room 9

Session leads: Maarten Oranje (Cordaid), Fentabil Getnet (Ethiopian Public Health Institute)

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Sustaining outcome focused partnerships: Learning from 20 years of personal outcome focused partnerships in Scotland

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Beyond Results: What outcomes-based financing can mean for systems change. Evidence & practical insights from India

Location: Tun Razak Lecture Theatre and online

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BASEMENT FLOOR

05 

Jobs Boost Outcomes Fund: Post-Pilot Evaluation Lessons Learned

Location: Seminar Room 1

Session leads: Akosua Koranteng (Presidential Youth Employment Intervention South Africa)

06 

Designing Outcomes-Based Financing that scales in low- and middle-income countries

Location: Seminar Room 2

Session leads: James Ronicle (Ecorys), Miléna Castellnou (Education Outcomes Fund)

07 

**Can data change policy to improve opportunity?
An innovative partnership approach in Gloucestershire**

Location: Seminar Room 3

Session leads: Dan Jacques (Barnwood Trust), Naomi Diamond (Collaborate CIC), Hannah Chesters (Gloucestershire County Council)

08 

Public Capital, Shared Outcomes: Social Outcome Partnerships in Denmark's Welfare State

Location: Seminar Room 4

Session leads: Emil Overgaard Bruhn (DSI)

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GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

DAY 2 - Croissants and Collaborations (08:30-10:00)

FIRST FLOOR

01

Primary Prevention as National Infrastructure: Designing Systems for Flourishing, Social Cohesion and Productivity

Location: Group Working Room 5

Facilitators: Bernadette Black (SEED Futures)

02

Public procurement and outcomes funding

Location: Group Working Room 9

Facilitators: Stuart Theobald (Krutham), Agostina Coniglio (Keidos)

03

What works in employment support: Insights from policy & practice

Location: Executive Seminar Room

Facilitators: Tanyah Hameed (Social Finance), Jenny Holmes (South Yorkshire MCA), Nick Butler (UK Department for Education)

BASEMENT FLOOR

04

Unpacking the UK's first Relational Property Development Agreement

Location: Seminar Room 1

Facilitators: Paul Clark (Stories), Sophie White (Aviva), Gavin Barlow (The Albany)

05

Relational Diagnostic: Mapping relational influence in outcomes-focused implementation

Location: Seminar Room 2

Facilitators: Bahana Saikia (UK Department for Work and Pensions)

06

Rethinking Outcomes-Based Partnerships and Incentives in Education Finance

Location: Seminar Room 3

Facilitators: Poornima Kharbanda (GSF), Rob Alhadeff (jackfruit Finance), Caleb Leseine (IDinsight), Joe DiSilvio (EOF), Lucas Tschan (iGravity)

Full programme
scan to view the programme
and choose your session

SOC26 at a glance

- **In person** at the Blavatnik School of Government & **online** via Zoom
  - not all sessions are available to the online audience. Where they are, please introduce yourself and display your name and organisation.
- We will use **Slido** for questions from both in person and online participants
  - join at slido.com #SOC26 or by scanning the QR code
- Hybrid sessions will be **recorded and shared** on the GO Lab website, alongside the programme slides.
- A **photographer** will be present throughout conference to take photos of **in person activities**. If you do not wish to be photographed, or have any questions, please speak to a member of the GO Lab team.

Join at
slido.com
#SOC26

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3 SEPTEMBER

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

#SOC26

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GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

Keynote Address

THE PEOPLE IN CROSS-SECTOR CONTRACTS

Ole Helby Petersen

Professor in Public Administration

Roskilde University & Visiting Professor University of Oxford

The People in Cross-Sector Contracts

Keynote: Social Outcomes Conference 2026

Ole Helby Petersen
Professor, Roskilde University
Director: Center for Research on Public-Private Collaboration
Visiting Professor, University of Oxford

Formal contract writing but relational contracting practice

A behavioral perspective on contracts

≈ 15% of GDP, almost 1/3 of government expenditure, EU TED: 155,006 contracts

- Why do current contracts look like this?
- How can behavioral insights inform current practice?
- What can we do about it? Lessons from a national-scale RCT

Recognizing the challenge: Incomplete contracts

- All contracts of non-trivial complexity are incomplete: Not everything can be anticipated and described in advance (products, prices, delivery, user needs, markets) → room for interpretation

- The classic (transactional) response: Write more contract language:
  - Tendering phase: market dialogue, specifications, tender conditions, contract terms
  - Contract phase: monitoring, measurement, penalties/rewards, dispute resolution

- **More writing cannot solve the fundamental challenge – too many future states of the world, high transaction costs of trying**

If many contracts are bound to be incomplete, why do we keep pursuing the traditional approach?

How can we put collaboration and value — rather than legal compliance — at the center of contracting?

Behavioral biases and their relevance to contracting

Three behavioral biases from psychology and behavioral economics (Kahneman, Tversky, others):

- **Planning fallacy:** We learn too little from past experiences when planning for the future
- **Loss aversion:** Losses affect us more than equivalent gains (around twice as much)
- **Self-serving bias:** We tend to interpret situations and information in ways that favor our own interests

Planning fallacy

Loss aversion

§17 Insurance

"The Supplier undertakes, throughout the contract period and in any extension thereof, to maintain customary and statutory insurance… The supplier's sum insured must amount to a **minimum of DKK 10,000,000** for personal injury/property damage per insurance year."

In two assessments according to the Section 26 within a continuous period of 6 months. (The order of the reviews is irrelevant)		**A penalty is given on the monthly remuneration at the location in question at:**
Rating 1	Rating 2	
***	***	10 %
***	**	15 %
***	*	20 %
**	**	20 %
**	*	30 %
*	*	40 %

Self-serving bias



Contract termination

"**All or part** of the contract may be terminated by the **contracting authority** in writing with a notice appropriate to the contracting authority to terminate on the 1st of a month."

"**The supplier cannot terminate** parts of the contract. The entire contract is irrevocable from the supplier during the first 12 months of the contract period. Thereafter, the entire contract can be terminated by the supplier…**in return for payment of DKK 150,000 excluding VAT**…"

So what does this mean for contract design?

We now know that contracts are incomplete and subject to common behavioral biases. So can we design them differently — and can we do so at scale?

National-scale formal-relational contracting RCT

- Formal-relational training program targeting all local and regional contract managers
- 220 public contract managers in 85 clusters (60% of all Danish municipalities, 80% of regions)
- Municipalities and regions each assigned to either treatment or control condition (cluster stratified sampling for group balance)
- In-person 5-day training at four locations; 75% attendance; 99% treatment received; 98% completion

(2SLS DiD estimation)

Training managers in formal-relational contracting

Relationship:
- Shared goals and success criteria
- Behavioral principles

Governance:
- Risks and rewards
- Relationship building/maintenance
- Adaptation
- Communication
- Conflict resolution

Did it work?

Training increased managers' confidence in formal-relational contracting

↑ **+0.70**

Governance mechanisms

↑ **+0.62**

Goals & guiding principles

Increase in relational contracting on a 1–7 scale. Both effects are statistically significant.

Training shifted contract design toward formal-relational contracting

↑ **+2.68**

Goals & collaboration

↑ **+2.82**

Governance

Increase in relational contracting on a 1–10 scale. Both effects are statistically significant.

Real-world applications

§ 6 Contract period
“The contract shall be in force from 01.01.2025 to 31.12.2028 and is irrevocable **for both parties** until 31.12.2026. After this, it is possible **for both parties** to terminate the contract with 12 months' notice…

The parties may extend the contract for two times up to 12 months, **if they agree**.”

§ 30 Breach of contract
“In the event of a breach…**the parties enter into a dialogue** about what will be done to remedy the breach and to avoid similar breaches in the future.

In the event of repeated cases of non-compliance or isolated cases of material breach, **an enhanced supervision period of 30 days is initiated**.

If the specific breach […] continues or is repeated after the end of the supervision period, **a fine may be imposed** […] or the **contract may be terminated**….”

Conclusion

“Preliminary findings indicate that businessmen often fail to plan exchange relationships completely, and seldom use legal sanctions to adjust these relationships or to settle disputes. Planning and legal sanctions are often unnecessary and may have undesirable consequences.”

(Stewart Macaulay, 1963, p. 55)

Thank you!

Some (fair) objections

- The legal framework is absolutely central, but from a public management perspective it should be subordinate to the main purpose: **creating public value**
- Formal-relational contracting under public procurement rules? Relational contracts rely on **“the value of future exchange”** – tomorrow is also future exchange
- **Behavioral insights can boost cooperation:** contract extensions subject to behavior; flexibility and reciprocity; reduce or increase frictions

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Panel discussion

THE PEOPLE IN CROSS-SECTOR CONTRACTS

Ole Helby Petersen
Roskilde University

Sam Rowbury
Cabinet Office

Ole Horsfeldt
Gorrissen Federspiel

Deborah Burand
NYU Law

Louise Savell
Social Finance

Eleanor Carter
University of Oxford
Chair

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NOW

Coffee break

11:00 BST

NEXT UP

Spotlight sessions

(two sessions available online)

11:45 BST

Full programme
scan to view the programme
and choose your session

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Coming up: Spotlight sessions (11:45-12:45)

FIRST FLOOR

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Online session reminder

- **In conversation with Lisandro Martín (16:15-17:30)**
  - Join us for a conversation with Lisandro Martín, Director of the Outcomes Department at the World Bank Group, moderated by Andreea Anastasiu, Executive Director of the GO Lab.

- To join an online session, simply click the **join online** button next to the session in the programme on our website.

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3 SEPTEMBER

SPOTLIGHT SESSIONS

#SOC26

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Executive Seminar Room

Spotlight session

DELIVERING BASIC INCOME AND PERSONALISED BUDGET PROGRAMMES IN WALES: FROM EVIDENCE TO IMPLEMENTATION

Jonathan Tan
Greater Change

Michael Sanders
King's College London

Mark Drakeford
(formerly) Welsh Government

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NOW

Lunch break

12:45 BST

NEXT UP

Roundtables and workshops

(in person only)

14:00 BST

Full programme

scan to view the programme and choose your session

Seminar Room 3

Spotlight session

CAN DATA CHANGE POLICY TO IMPROVE OPPORTUNITY? AN INNOVATIVE PARTNERSHIP APPROACH IN GLOUCESTERSHIRE

Dan Jaques

Barnwood Trust

Naomi Chesters

Collaborate CIC

Hannah Chesters

Gloucershire County Council

Can data change policy to improve opportunity? An innovative approach in Gloucestershire

Dan Jacques – Barnwood Trust

Hannah Chesters – Gloucestershire Children's Services

Naomi Diamond – Collaborate

So, what is the Gloucestershire Short Breaks Partnership?

A two-year test-and-learn collaboration looking to see how services can be designed, delivered and commissioned differently to remove barriers for those using them.

Informed by research, £2.5 million has been invested over this period to enable this and Collaborate's evaluation.

10 projects have been funded across Gloucestershire with a brief to innovate, co-design with children and families, and widen access.

Our starting point…

I've never been asked that. What would I like to do?

Young Person (school leaver)

I'm so used to being at home. I almost sometimes feel scared to go out, I haven't had many social opportunities in my life really.

Young Person (school leaver)

It's difficult to get an assessment and information about…short breaks are not readily available. Carers don't have the time and energy, hence missing out.

Parent-Carer

The fact that I, as a carer, am often suicidal and with chronic illness, did nothing to get any respite.

Parent-Carer

The gap…

Disabled Children accessing universal provision

Unmet Need

Rural Isolation

Provision

Complexity

Disabled Children accessing social care services

Families were struggling to find the right support.

We discovered:

- Demand was much larger than the data suggested
- Rurality was creating unequal access
- Systems were fragmented and hard to navigate.
- Complexity of need was increasing

Gloucestershire County Council · barnwood · collaborate for social change · Gloucestershire VCSE Alliance

Understanding the partnership…



What have we achieved?

1 A new way of commissioning

The SHARE framework – unique in the UK, and built to get us upstream into early intervention.

2 Questioning the status quo

GCC are now taking that learning inside, influencing their own procurement and legal colleagues.

3 Bridging the gap

Council and VCSE relationships much improved, sharing the load rather than carrying it alone.

4 Choice and voice by design

Young people heard in decisions, and the barriers families face designed out from the start.

How did we get here…

We followed the data

We reframed the conversation

Learning informed decision making


What are you noticing about who can access support, influence decisions, and feel included - and who may be missing out?
Access, Power & Participation
What are you noticing about the strengths, relationships and contributions that are recognised, valued and resourced?
Assets and Value
Children, young people & families
Providers & practioners
Funders & commissioners
Wider system
Learning to Action
Shaping Offers
What are you noticing about how learning is leading to meaningful change - and where action may be getting stuck?
What are you noticing about how well Short Breaks reflect people's lives, needs and preferences - and where it may need to adapt?

But it wasn't just about the data…

We navigated risks

We overcame system pressures

We valued different cultures

So, can data change policy

Not by itself…



Gloucestershire County Council barn wood collaborate for social change Gloucestershire VCSE Alliance

The final word…

Every child is celebrated for their individual strengths… my son has found a place where he feels he belongs.

In other aspects of her life [my daughter] seems to be getting on in the right direction at secondary school… she's started to become a really happy young woman. I can't really express enough of how much I feel these have been part of that.

I've seen a huge improvement in confidence, physical benefits for fitness and huge mental health benefits. They were a rare chance for me as a carer and my child to relax, enjoy ourselves and meet others in the same position.

It's wonderful just to see the children free and have fun, judgement free.

Thank you!

Dan Jacques
Social Change Manager, Barnwood Trust
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https://www.linkedin.com/in/daniel-jacques-5876a9195/

Naomi Diamond
Head of Practice, Collaborate CIC
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Hannah Chesters
Senior Commissioning Manager, GCC
hannah.chesters@gloucestershire.gov.uk

Read our latest learning report

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NOW

Lunch break

12:45 BST

NEXT UP

Roundtables and workshops

(in person only)

14:00 BST

Full programme

scan to view the programme and choose your session

Group Working Room 5

Spotlight session

SUSTAINING OUTCOME FOCUSED PARTNERSHIPS: LEARNING FROM 20 YEARS OF PERSONAL OUTCOME FOCUSED PARTNERSHIPS IN SCOTLAND

Ailsa Cook
Aisla Cook Consulting

Sustaining outcome focused partnerships

Dr Ailsa Cook, AC Consulting

Dr Emma Miller and Professor Margaret Whoriskey University of Strathclyde

Ellen Daly, Iriss

Ailsa Cook
CONSULTING

Plan for this session

- Learning from 20 years of personal outcomes work in Scotland
- Discussion in pairs
  - What resonates with your work?
- Small group discussions
  - What are the factors that help and hinder your organisation sustain an outcome focus?
- Whole group discussion and final reflections
  - How can we sustain outcome focused innovation in the context of austerity?

Scottish policy context

- National outcomes framework
- 20 years of outcome focused public service reform
- Focus on personalisation, co-production, partnership working
- Long standing ambition / challenge to shift performance reporting from outputs to outcomes for people

Talking Points implementation journey

2004-6	2006-8	2008-12	2012-14	2014-26
Research	Testing in practice	Early adopters	Embedding and scaling	Community adoption

Talking Points Approach (2006-present)





Focusing on what matters to people

Understanding outcomes



Four key shifts

- Service-led to outcome focused
- From fixer to facilitator
- From attribution to contribution
- From proving to improving



Progress

- Non-linear journey of implementation
- Personal outcomes language and concepts deeply embedded in policy
- Practice embedded and sustained in pockets
- Active Personal Outcomes Network (300 orgs)
- Informal co-ordination of ongoing research and development

Sustaining factors

- Implementation process focused on relational practice first
  - Systems and processes driven by practice
- Data and information used for improvement first, performance second
- Organisational leadership and commitment over time
  - Local and national levels
- Policy and scrutiny recognise and reward outcomes
- Community of practice and peer support

Outcomes in the context of austerity



In pairs

- What resonates with your work?

Small group discussion

- What are the factors that have helped and hindered sustaining an outcomes focus in your work?

Thank you!

Let's keep the conversation going

www.linkedin.com/in/ailsa-cook/

ailsa@ailsacook.com

Ailsa Cook
CONSULTING

NOW
Lunch break
12:45 BST

NEXT UP
Roundtables and workshops
(in person only)

14:00 BST

Full programme
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and choose your session

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Group Working Room 9

Spotlight session

MOTIVATING THE HEALTH WORKFORCE IN TIMES OF REDUCED FINANCING: UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF PERFORMANCE-BASED FINANCING (PBF) IN ETHIOPIA

Maarten Oranje
Cordaid

Fentabil Getnet Yimer
Ethiopian Public Health Institute

NOW

Lunch break

12:45 BST

NEXT UP

Roundtables and workshops

(in person only)

14:00 BST

Full programme

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Spotlight session

JOBS BOOST OUTCOMES FUND: POST-PILOT EVALUATION LESSONS LEARNED

Akosua Koranteng
Presidential Youth Employment Intervention South Africa

SOCIAL OUTCOMES CONFERENCE 2026 · SPOTLIGHT SESSION · OXFORD · 3 SEPTEMBER 2026

Jobs Boost Outcomes Fund

Post-Pilot Evaluation Lessons

Lessons from the Value for Money and Process Evaluations of South Africa's largest employment outcomes fund

Akosua Koranteng · MERL and Demand-Led Skilling Lead, Presidential Youth Employment Intervention · The Presidency, Republic of South Africa

PRESIDENTIAL YOUTH EMPLOYMENT INTERVENTION

THE PRESIDENCY REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

CONTEXT

The Skills Funding Challenge

South Africa faces one of the most severe youth unemployment crises globally, while public skills funding has historically paid for training inputs rather than employment outcomes.

YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT CRISIS

Structural barriers in both the labour market and the skills development system limit young people's transition into work.

INPUT-BASED FUNDING

Funding through the Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) and the National Skills Fund (NSF) has prioritised training delivery and completion.

SKILLS MISMATCHES

Persistent mismatches between training provision and employer demand, with weak links to the labour market.

LIMITED ACCOUNTABILITY

Payment follows compliance with spending plans, with limited accountability for labour market outcomes.

CONTEXT

South Africa's Outcomes-Based Financing Journey

2018

First social impact bonds

Bonds4Jobs and the ECD Innovation Fund Impact Bond introduce outcomes-based contracting to South Africa.

2021

Pay-for-Performance Employment Project

Initiative of the National Skills Fund (NSF) and the Presidency. Its learnings directly informed the design of the Jobs Boost pilot.

2023

Jobs Boost Outcomes Fund

R300m outcomes fund launched by the NSF and the Presidency (PYEI), paying for verified employment outcomes.

2024

ECCE Outcomes Fund

R500m Early Childhood Care and Education Outcomes Fund launched by the Department of Basic Education (DBE).

2026

From pilots to mainstreaming

The Presidency hosts the Outcomes Finance Alliance Summit in Cape Town. Working towards a R1bn Jobs Boost scale-up. Embedding OBF within funding mechanisms within PSET system.

THE MODEL

The Pay-for-Performance Model

INPUT-BASED FUNDING

Government pays for enrolments, activities and inputs.

Payment follows compliance with a spending plan, whether or not the intended outcome materialises. The state carries the full risk of non-delivery.

OUTCOMES-BASED FUNDING

Government defines the outcome, and pays when it is independently verified.

In Jobs Boost, 80 percent of payments are contingent on verified placement and retention milestones. Risk shifts to providers and the investors backing them.

EMBRACING OBF IN GOVERNMENT

Why SA Government is Embracing Outcomes-Based Funding

01

Service delivery

Pays for results, not activity. The risk of non-delivery shifts off the state, and providers adapt in real time to achieve the outcome that matters to the citizen.

02

Accountability

Payment triggers on independently verified outcomes, and a clear cost-per-outcome makes value for money visible to Treasury, Parliament and the Auditor-General.

03

Fiscal constraint

Scarce public funds are protected from underperformance, investors provide the upfront working capital, and private and philanthropic funding is crowded in.

JOBS BOOST

The Jobs Boost Outcomes Fund

A R300 million (€16m) outcomes fund supporting the placement of excluded youth into quality jobs, launched in 2023 by the Presidency and the National Skills Fund (NSF).

EXCLUDED YOUTH

Aged 18 to 34, unemployed or in precarious employment, with Grade 12 or lower, from Quintile 1 to 3 public schools and/or Child Support Grant beneficiaries.

QUALITY JOBS

12-month-plus contracts of employment at minimum wage or above, fully remunerated by the employer from day one.

PAY FOR PERFORMANCE

80 percent of payments contingent on placement and retention milestones that are independently assessed and audited.

OPEN, COMPETITIVE DELIVERY

12 implementation partners appointed through open competition (102 submissions), with independent outcomes auditing by BDO and Karolia Jeena.

RESULTS

Jobs Boost Headline Results

9,260

Youth enrolled

100 percent of participants meet the fund's excluded-youth eligibility criteria.

6,813

Placed in quality jobs

51 percent above the placement target, across 215 employers.

4,991

Sustained at 3 months

With 3,795 young people sustaining employment at 6 months.

Evaluation-verified figures: KOMIS Value for Money Evaluation, April 2026. Median salary R4,781 (€250); 80.4 percent of placements at or above the national minimum wage; 58 percent women.

EVIDENCE

Independent Evaluation Confirms Value for Money

R49,732

Cost per sustained outcome (€2,600)

Below the SETA system average of R53,627 (€2,866), while purchasing a harder standard: verified sustained employment, not training completion.

1.56×

Attrition multiplier

Against the SETA system's 2.27×. Lower is better: implementation partners, not the state, carry pre-placement dropout costs.

<5%

Management and verification overhead

95 percent of budget flows to outcomes payments, below the NSF administration benchmark of 7.5 percent.

Source: KOMIS Value for Money Evaluation, April 2026. Independent evaluation commissioned by GIZ/CPD4E on behalf of the PYEI.

EVIDENCE

Four Learnings from the Process Evaluation

1 Results over activities, proven

Tying 80 percent of funding to placement and retention milestones flipped the incentive from inputs to outcomes.

2 The creaming myth, debunked

The most disadvantaged youth (Quintile 1) retained at 67 percent, higher than Quintile 2 and 3 combined at 63 percent.

3 Partner delivery models matter

The strongest implementation partners were vertically integrated or direct delivery models in which they secured employer demand before initiating any training.

4 Human infrastructure matters

Wraparound psycho-social and soft-skills support, not curriculum, was a strong predictor of retention.

PRESIDENTIAL YOUTH EMPLOYMENT INTERVENTION

EVIDENCE

Conditions for Scale-Up

FROM PROOF OF CONCEPT TO SCALE

The pilot generated sufficient evidence to move to scale-up, with 3-month conversion rates ranging from 46 to 84 percent across partners, and minimum standards for partner implementation to be embedded.

1 **Strengthen participant protections**

Consistent grievance mechanisms, safeguarding and post-placement support across all partners.

2 **Improve payment reliability**

A liquidity mechanism for implementing partners, so delays do not cascade to employers and stipends.

3 **Digitise verification**

Moving from manual payslip checks toward digital-first verification, integrated with national systems.

4 **Manage partner performance consistency**

Performance-gated contracting: smaller initial allocations, with expansion earned on evidence.

The question is no longer whether OBF works, but whether it can **work at scale in the public sector.**

This requires:

CAPABILITY

Public sector capability to design, procure and manage outcomes-based contracts.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Payment, verification and data systems built for outcomes, not inputs.

COALITION

A coalition across government, funders, evaluators and providers to carry the model into standard practice.

PRESIDENTIAL YOUTH EMPLOYMENT INTERVENTION

SYSTEM REFORM

Evidence Builds Political Will

FROM PILOT TO MAINSTREAMING

Evaluation evidence from Jobs Boost is informing the reform of the National Skills Fund (NSF), a R5 billion (€260m) skills funding mechanism, toward outcomes-oriented, demand-led financing.

1. **A President's directive anchors the reform**

   Announced in the 2026 State of the Nation Address (SONA): the NSF will become outcomes-oriented.

2. **Rigorous evaluation supported political buy-in**

   Independent VfM and process evaluations gave decision-makers credible domestic evidence.

3. **Real-time learning shaped design**

   Learnings fed into scale-up design and NSF reform while the pilot was still running.

4. **Adoption is spreading across government**

   The R500 million (€27m) ECCE Outcomes Fund (DBE, 2024), SAMRC outcomes funds and Treasury metro trading services are examples of government participation in OBF.

PRESIDENTIAL YOUTH EMPLOYMENT INTERVENTION

THE PRESIDENCY REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

SCALE-UP

Working Towards a R1bn (€50m) Scale-Up

FROM PILOT TO MAINSTREAMING

Anchor government commitments from NSF and DEL , and layering private sector funders on standardised terms.

1 **Reweight milestones toward sustained employment**

Deepening the incentive on retention, not just placement.

2 **Expand eligibility without compromising integrity**

Recognising gig, seasonal and transitional employment pathways.

3 **Standardise the institutional architecture**

An NPC as standard counterparty, retaining the clearing house model.

4 **Replace reporting burden with performance incentives**

Outcome-linked administration and stronger delivery infrastructure.

DISCUSSION

What Does It Take to Institutionalise Outcomes-Based Financing?

1 **The binding constraint**

In your context, what most limits the move from pilots to institutionalised OBF: capability, political will, systems, or evidence?

2 **Evidence and political buy-in**

How has evidence moved, or failed to move, your government or funders toward outcomes-based approaches?

3 **Verification and trust**

How can outcomes funds keep verification credible and independent without the cost and friction that put off providers and funders?

4 **Join the conversation**

Share your responses at menti.com using the session code on screen.

PRESIDENTIAL YOUTH EMPLOYMENT INTERVENTION

IN CLOSING

Outcomes-based financing is a discipline: define, measure, and pay for what matters.

PROOF

Jobs Boost demonstrates the model can deliver desired labour market outcomes in the South African skills system.

VALUE

Independent evaluation confirms value for money against the SETA system benchmark.

SCALE

Working towards a R1bn fund, with the NSF and private sector at the centre of an outcomes-oriented skills system.

PRESIDENTIAL YOUTH EMPLOYMENT INTERVENTION

BLAVATNIK SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

NOW

Lunch break

12:45 BST

NEXT UP

Roundtables and workshops

(in person only)

14:00 BST

Full programme

scan to view the programme and choose your session

GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

Seminar Room 4

Spotlight session

PUBLIC CAPITAL, SHARED OUTCOMES: SOCIAL OUTCOME PARTNERSHIPS IN DENMARK'S WELFARE STATE

Emil Overgaard Bruhn

Den Sociale Investeringsfond

PUBLIC CAPITAL, SHARED OUTCOMES

Social Outcome Partnerships in Denmark's Welfare State

Emil Overgaard Bruhn, *Den Sociale Investeringsfond (DSI)*

DEN **SOCIALE** INVESTERINGSFOND

Why would a strong and well-funded welfare state need SOPs?

THE ”OLD” ASSUMPTION

SOPs = new capital and risk sharing

Useful when capital is scarce and risk willingness is low

→

THE "NEW" SELLING POINT

SOPs = A partnership model to overcome structural barriers

Time · Silos · Split benefits · Different risks

The Danish welfare system in short: Local autonomy creates room to act inside uniform national constraints

Common national framework – no legislative devolution

State

Sets rights, law
and macroeconomic
framework (overall budget
constraints)

Regions (4)

Health care services
(corresponds roughly to
the NHS)

Municipalities (98)

Deliver most welfare · set local priorities · raise municipal
income tax

Some degree of economic and administrative devolution

Who is DSI?

- A state-owned fund with six politically defined investment areas

DEN **SOCIALE** INVESTERINGSFOND

Vulnerable children and young people

Entering the labour market

People with disabilities

Work environment

Equality in health

Well-being

The journey of the Danish SOP market



Powered by B

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Accumulated Number of SOPs by DSI and Den Sociale Kapitalfond (SKF)



Accumulated Committed Capital by DSI and Den Sociale Kapitalfond (SKF)



An example of DSI's Model for SOPs: Housing First in Aarhus



DEN **SOCIALE** INVESTERINGSFOND

Housing First in Aarhus: A temporary SOP can unlock a permanent service

Housing First + employment support

91%

Maintained a stable housing situation

Only 10%

Entered employment or education – significantly below expectations

Adopted as ”business as usual”

Aarhus mainstreamed the service in 2025

SOP pilot 2021-2025 → final results 2025 → mainstream delivery

DSI has a strategic goal that 70% of its investments to result in services that are permanently embedded in mainstream delivery. (6/9 so far)

The intermediary as the institution

DSI

Public intermediary and investor

1 **IDENTIFY** → 2 **CONVENE** → 3 **STRUCTURE**

1 IDENTIFY: blocked interventions

2 CONVENE: actors + budgets

3 STRUCTURE: outcomes + risk

4 INVEST: patient capital

5 LEARN: across projects

6 TRANSLATE: practice → policy

6 **TRANSLATE** ← 5 **LEARN** ← 4 **INVEST**

Politically accountable. Non-partisan. Operationally independent.

DEN **SOCIALE**
INVESTERINGSFOND

Finding the right balance

Market-oriented focus

More SOPs

- Larger outcome funds
- Standard contracts
- More private capital

DSI
is trying to balance both

Public sector focus

Better government

- Practice enters business as usual
- Budgets and incentives change
- Commissioning evolves
- Policy learns from implementation

A successful SOP may ultimately result in fewer SOPs because the practice became mainstream.

Three design principles for governments

01

Build a standing capability

Demand is built through trust, language and practice.

02

Design independence + accountability

Long-term focus and thinking inside a public mandate.

03

Create a project-to-policy loop

Local evidence must travel into budgets, commissioning and reform.

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UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
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NOW
Lunch break
12:45 BST

NEXT UP
Roundtables and workshops
(in person only)
14:00 BST

Full programme
scan to view the programme
and choose your session

Seminar Room 2

Spotlight session

DESIGNING OUTCOMES-BASED FINANCING THAT SCALES IN LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES

James Ronicle

Ecorys

Miléna Castellnou

Education Outcomes Fund

The Sierra Leone Education Innovation Challenge (SLEIC)

Structure and roles

Government

Identified schools and sets outcome targets for learning gains.

EOF

Regulated and oversaw the implementing partners' delivery on behalf of the Government.

Beneficiaries

125,000 children in 325 schools

Implementing partners: supported schools and teachers to improve learning in government schools

RISING ACADEMY NETWORK
Save the Children
EducAid Sierra Leone
STREET CHILD

Social Investors: supported implementing partners with pre-financing and program management support

BRIDGES OUTCOMES PARTNERSHIPS
ROCKDALE FOUNDATION

Outcome funders

The Republic of Sierra Leone

UK International Development
Partnership | Progress | Prosperity

KOICA
Korea International Cooperation Agency

Bank of America

HEMPEL FOUNDATION

5 Implementing Partners delivered interventions covering all the districts

Implementing partner	Investor
EducAid	Bridges Outcomes Partnership
Street Child	Bridges Outcomes Partnership
Rising Academy Network	Bridges Outcomes Partnership
Save the Children	N/A
National Youth Awareness Forum	Rockdale Foundation

Implementation lots

1 SLEIC achieved scale and learning impact year on year



Strong numeracy gains across multiple lots and for both boys and girls. Literacy averaged 0.102 SDs.

2 Challenging target of 0.27 SDs actually exceeded in several models...



- Outcomes ranged from **0.05 to 0.39 SDs** incurring **both bonus payments and investor losses**
- One lot **exceeded the learning targets** for both literacy and numeracy by up to **45% among girls**.

OBF changed how delivery partners managed for results

The clearest effects were behavioural and operational, not a single “silver bullet”.

1	**Sharper outcomes focus**	Linking payments to outcomes increased attention on what outcomes were being achieved
2	**Data became a management tool**	Partners increasingly used monitoring and learning data to identify problems and guide delivery.
3	**Greater freedom to course-correct**	Flexibility over activities enabled providers to pivot, differentiate support and test new approaches.
4	**More joint problem-solving**	Providers, investors, EOF and government worked together to address barriers

System change is emerging through embedding, not scale-up

Fiscal constraints blocked direct scale-up, but the outcomes focus is carrying into wider policy and financing.

1. **No direct scale-up as planned**

   Fiscal constraints, limited education budgets and donor funding cuts prevented government scale-up.

2. **Components embedded instead**

   Lessons on attendance, coaching and government funding are carrying into other support by delivery orgs; early childhood outcomes fund; GPE and World Bank investments.

3. **Government 'paradigm shift' for outcomes**

   Engagement in future outcomes funds; school subsidies becoming performance based. Also driven by others factors beyond SLEIC

Implications for other outcomes funds

Three practical lessons for future outcomes-based education programmes.

01 Revisit sustainability assumptions regularly

Agree realistic continuation, scaling and evidence-uptake pathways early on, but revisit regularly during delivery as context shifts

02 Secure credible funding

Upfront government funding can reduce payment risk and strengthen confidence in the model.

03 Build trust in evaluation

Agree methods early, communicate transparently and create regular feedback points for providers.

ECORYS Answering tomorrow's challenges today

04 | IMPLICATIONS #2

Implications for other outcomes funds: Launching without the DREAM conditions

DREAM factor	How to launch OBF without condition present	Risks
D Demand from government	Donors / foundations act as outcome payers Prove value through narrow, low-risk pilot	Government doesn't engage, OBF not embedded Realistic in new donor landscape?
R Regulatory framework	Work with government to change regulation Use agencies with supportive frameworks (donors, multilaterals)	Bypassing local regulation doesn't support future OBFs
E Economic & political context	Move quickly to protect OBF from electoral cycles Engage philanthropic investors willing to take bigger risks	Rushed design is weaker design
A Availability of data	Launch pilot to gather baseline data	Longer pilot (prone to political cycles) Baseline errors create unrealistic targets
M Market capacity	Draw on international organisations with OBF experience Build local capacity via train-the-trainer	International delivery doesn't build local capacity Inexperienced local actors add risk

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Seminar Room 2

Spotlight session

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NOW
Lunch break
12:45 BST

NEXT UP
Roundtables and workshops
(in person only)
14:00 BST

Full programme
scan to view the programme
and choose your session

Tun Razak Lecture Theatre

Spotlight session

BEYOND RESULTS: WHAT OUTCOMES-BASED FINANCING CAN MEAN FOR SYSTEMS CHANGE. EVIDENCE & PRACTICAL INSIGHTS FROM INDIA

Divya Nambiar
Oxford Policy Management

Dayoung Lee
Dalberg Advisors

Barkat Ul Nisa
National Skill Development Corporation

Nitya Daryanani
British Asian Trust

Dhir Jhingran
Language and Learning Foundation

Outcomes-based financing has shown strong potential to drive systems change in India

OUTCOME FUNDING
USD 113M

PEOPLE BENEFITED
~3 million lives

SECTORS COVERED
Education · Skilling · WASH · Health · Entrepreneurship

2015 — Pilot development impact bond (DIB) in education
Educate Girls DIB
Beneficiaries: 7,300 students
Outcome Funding: USD 422K
Investment Fund: USD 270K

2016 — Swachh Bharat Mission–Gramin results-based financing
SBM-G Programme
Beneficiaries: ~100M rural households
Fund Size: USD1.3B World Bank PforR, majority linked to outcomes

2017 — First Social Success Note (SSN) in Education
SSN to Improve Learning Outcomes in Affordable Private Schools *(Varthana)*
Beneficiaries: 200,000 students
Fund Size: USD 3M

2018 — World's then largest education impact bond
Quality Education India DIB
Beneficiaries: 200,000 students
Outcome Funding: USD 9.18M
Investment Fund: up to USD 3M

2018 — Maternal and child health impact bond
***Utkrisht* Impact Bond**
Beneficiaries: 600,000 women
Outcome Funding: USD 8M
Investment Fund: USD 4.8M

2019 — First Impact Guarantee using CSR Funding
Haryana Early Literacy 'Pay for Success'
Beneficiaries: 164,000 students
Outcome Funding: USD 2.3M
Max. Perf. Guarantee: USD 0.45M

2021 — First impact bond for youth employment with NSDC
Skill Impact Bond
Beneficiaries: ~50,000 youth
Outcome Funding: USD 14.4M
Investment Fund: USD 4.1M

2022 — Impact bond to strengthen public education system
LiftEd DIB for FLN
Beneficiaries: 1.5 M students
Fund Size: USD 15M

2023 — First Pay By Results For Edtech With The Government, backed by NITI Aayog
PAL Lab
Beneficiaries: 70K+ students
Fund Size: USD 5M, with ~50% of provider payments linked to independently verified learning gains.

2025 — Pay-by-results model in nano-entrepreneurship
Nano-Entrepreneurship Sustainability and Transformation Outcomes Facility
Beneficiaries: ~730 entrepreneurs
Outcome Funding: USD 600K

2026 — Scale up of OBF for youth employment with GoI as an outcome funder
Skills Outcomes Fund
Beneficiaries: 200,000 youth
Fund Size: USD 60M

- Education
- Livelihoods
- Healthcare
- WASH

LiftEd DIB, a 5-year initiative reaching 1.5mn students, is designed to deliver on the ‘holy grail’ of impact: Effectiveness, Cost Efficiency, Scale, and Sustainability

Effectiveness

Rigorous targets set **for foundational literacy and numeracy**, even when intervention models act through system elements (e.g., district, block officials) and are a few degrees of separation from students

Efficient

Highly **cost effective model** with per outcome at ~USD 6-8 per child per year

Scalable

The bond **reaches 1.5 mn students indirectly** (largest in education globally), with presence in 5 diverse states/ regions in India -- from the capital in New Delhi to smaller hill-region states

Sustainable

Apart from focus on student outcomes, there is a **strong focus on incentivizing lasting shifts** by tying payments to “systemic shift indicators” that measure how effectively the system is adopting good practices

Note: Non-exhaustive ; Source: Dalberg analysis

Its $10 mn outcome funding pool is divided in a 60:40 between systemic shift indicators (SSIs) and student learning outcomes (SLOs)

USD 9 mn
LiftED DIB Outcome Fund

	USD 5.4 mn ***Systemic Shift Indicators (SSI) - linked pool***	**USD 3.6 mn** ***Student Learning Outcome (SLO)-linked pool***
What it is	Key metrics around improving administrative practices, teacher mentoring, and classroom practices mapped to each IP's theory of change that are both outputs & signals of lasting systemic change.	**Key foundational literacy and numeracy competencies as defined by government. Targets are set in terms of diff-in-diff against a comparison group.**
Payment frequency	Annual	After endlines
Measurement	Targets for adoption of each practice for each IP. Assessment is done via a verification of IP reported data and qualitative field observations via a third party evaluator.	• Independent and oral FLN assessments administered by an external evaluator • Targets are set for a three-year gain (there are two cohorts, each 3-years)
Flexibility	IPs can make up for their own SSI performance only; not other IPs'	IPs can make up for their SLO performance or SSI performance, and other IPs SLO performance

Note: **LiftEd had one learning year, followed by four outcome-funded years, comprising two student cohorts of three year each (Grade 1-3). Payment is divided equally between two cohorts.**

Example of SSIs

Indicators	Definition
Number of effective block-level meetings observed	**Rubric for defining an effective meeting :(any 3 out of 4 indicators should be met for effectiveness)** • FLN agenda set and was discussed • At least 50% Middle managers share their observations/ best practices from their school visit. • Action plan agreed for additional FLN support to schools (training/ additional visits etc.) • Previous review meeting decisions were discussed and reviewed
Number of effective school visits conducted by Middle Managers	**Rubric for defining a school classroom visit by Middle manager (any 2 out of 3 indicators met during visit):** • Classroom observation for at least 2 classes (Math and Language) on priority TIPPS[1] indicator followed by a debrief • Demonstration of an activity for any one School Process at a time (BALA, LIBRARY, BAL SABHA, BAL SANSAD) followed by a debrief with HM and teachers. • Developing action plan for 2 weeks in consultation with HM to be done at school level to improve processes and FLN practices.
Number of classroom observations in which teachers were following good instructional practices inside and outside classroom	**Rubric for defining an effective FLN classroom strategies (any 3 out of 4 indicators met during visit):** • Teacher using TLMs • Teacher facilitated at-least one activity • Teacher demonstrating at least 2 indicators of TIPPS[1] • Teacher asking for feedback post classroom from students

Our role as MEL partner on the Skill Impact Bond



Driving impact through evidence



Oxford Policy Management

Government ownership ≠ handover

THE ROLE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PARTNER

Work alongside, not just through the government



Design for scale

Co-create

Strengthen system capacity

OBFs and Systems Change

Programs should answer two questions:

1 ***Are many students learning better?***

2 ***Has the system become better equipped to sustain improved learning?***



Objectives

System strengthening to be built into OBF objectives and outcomes.

Indicators & Metrics

Funders and partners develop indicators/metrics that measure systems change.

Funding

Funding and design to include system capacity building.

Resources for further reading

Further reading on the LiftEd DIB

Further reading on the Skill Impact Bond

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NOW

Lunch break

12:45 BST

NEXT UP

Roundtables and workshops

(in person only)

14:00 BST

Full programme

scan to view the programme and choose your session

GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

3 SEPTEMBER

ROUNDTABLES AND WORKSHOPS

#SOC26

BLAVATNIK SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
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GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

Roundtables and workshops (14:00-15:30)

FIRST FLOOR

01

From the Saxon settlement to the manor house - why funding the social economy is USP and not SPV

Location: Group Working Room 9

Session leads: David Neaum (NPC), Julie Robin (University of Poitiers), Ruth Stephens (TNLCF), Jack Wakefield (SIB), Ged Devlin (Key Fund), Alex Parker (B Lab UK) Nigel Ball (Chair), Kieron Boyle (Impact Investing Institute), Esmé Clifford Astbury (Office for the Impact Economy)

02

Developing a research agenda in the space between formal and relational contracting

Location: Executive Seminar Room

Session leads: Michael Gibson (University of Oxford), Avishai Benish (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Kristina Patterson (Georgia Southern University), Ole Helby Petersen (Roskilde University), Jill Carswell (UK Department for Education), Stéphane Saussier (Sorbonne Business School), Deanna Malatesta (Indiana University), Ole Horsfeldt (Gorrissen Federspiel), Caroly Heinrich (Vanderbilt University), David Van Slyke (Syracuse University)

BASEMENT FLOOR

03

Meet the outcomes funding innovators

Location: Seminar Rooms 1&2

Session leads: Prateek Garg (OpenSource Pharma), Can Atacik (Alethina Impact), Julia Greenland (Imara Impact), Lee-Ann Davids (SAMRC), Tuğçe Söğüt (Impact Investing Advisory Board), Montgomery Simus (The Ocean Cleanup), Andreea Anastasiu (University of Oxford)

04

Digital Innovation and Outcomes Contracting: Promise, Practice, and Pitfalls

Location: Seminar Rooms 3&4

Session leads: Neil Stanworth (ATQ Consultants), Ivan Foberg (Roskilde University), Juliana Outes Velarde (University of Oxford), Paul Atfield (EOF), Munib Qasim Zia (Destillo AI Inc), Rony Birman (SFI Group), Jaakko Kaartinen (Taso Research)

Seminar Room 3&4

Roundtable

DIGITAL INNOVATION AND OUTCOMES CONTRACTING: PROMISE, PRACTICE, AND PITFALLS

Neil Stanworth
ATQ Consultants

Ivan Foberg
Roskilde University

Paul Atfield
Education Outcomes Fund

Munib Qasim Zia
Destillo AI Inc

Rony Birman
Social Finance Israel

Jaakko Kaartinen
Taso Research

Juliana Outes Velarde
University of Oxford
Chair

SOC26 · DIGITAL INNOVATION AND OUTCOMES CONTRACTING

OutcomesOS

A unified modelling approach to education outcomes. Taking the administrative burden out of programme design, and sharing the method as a public good.

THE OPPORTUNITY

A structural gap, not a funding gap.

Investment efficiency is weakened by a focus on outputs rather than verified learning outcomes. Meanwhile every deal repeats the same analytical work by hand: what should this cost, what targets are fair, how do we group schools into contracts.

300+

impact bonds launched globally

GO Lab INDIGO dataset, November 2024

$0.8bn

committed capital in launched deals

GO Lab INDIGO dataset, June 2024

470+

deals in design across 73+ countries

Outcomes Accelerator Pipeline Database, May 2026

- What is needed is accountability for outcomes alongside flexibility in delivery.

Data that already exists, finally connected.

Four sources, none of them new. What has been missing is a way to hold them together.

Programme costs

Budgets and actual spend from live outcomes funds, line by line.

Government records

School and facility level administrative data: enrolment, staffing, location.

Evaluation results

Verified outcomes from completed programmes, ours and others.

Open indicators

World Bank, UNESCO and national statistics for context and comparison.

- The gain is integration, not collection.

One framework, running in two directions.

The same structured framework runs in two directions. Backwards to learn what worked and at what cost. Forwards to price the next programme before it starts.

LOOKING BACK · BUILDING THE EVIDENCE BASE

01
Classify
Language models sort messy transaction lines into consistent categories.

→

02
Cost
Build the picture twice, down from past programmes and up from single schools.

→

03
Calibrate
Reconcile the two against real spend until the model matches reality.

→

04
Compare outcomes
Put verified results from different programmes on a common footing.

→

05
Test what works
Set outcomes against costs statistically to see which approaches actually pay off.

LOOKING FORWARD · DESIGNING THE NEXT PROGRAMME

06
Price it in advance
Estimate the cost of an outcome before the programme exists, from what the evidence says.

→

07
Set targets, test trade-offs
Move dosage, geography or scale and watch the cost and the target move with it.

→

08
Produce the documents
Contract lots, budgets and business cases generated from the same numbers.

→

Then a person decides
What is credible, what is fair, what a government will accept.

↩ Each programme delivered returns to step 01 as new evidence, and the model recalibrates.

■ The tool produces the evidence. It does not produce the decision.

3 · THE OUTPUT

What it has produced so far.

NAMIBIA · COSTING

$106 to $617

per child, same partner

The range reflects dosage, geography, new versus existing centres and whether teachers are already salaried. A months-long comparison now runs in under an hour, and updates while the government is still in the room.

LAGOS · CONTRACT LOTS

>90%

balance on all factors at once

Schools, student numbers, out-of-school populations and geographic continuity, held simultaneously rather than traded off in sequence. Built for Lagos, then reused in Namibia with different parameters.

ACROSS EOF · CAPACITY

1.29 FTE

2,187 hours a year, about $262k

Redirected to programme delivery, fundraising and strategy rather than administration. Tracked from inception, at US$120 per hour and a 1,700-hour full time equivalent.

- Administrative burden moving towards zero.

THE HONEST TEST

Not cheaper. Different.

Every generation of tools has promised lower costs. The better question is what becomes possible that was not possible before.

Hold many factors at once	Balancing four competing criteria simultaneously is not something manual allocation can replicate, regardless of how much time is available.
Argue live	When a ministry challenges an assumption, the number is rebuilt in the meeting rather than in a report six weeks later.
Compare across contexts	Consistent categories mean a cost in one country can inform a decision in another. Knowledge accumulates instead of resetting.

- Efficiency was the side effect, not the point.

A cost model can entrench inequity as easily as expose it.

If cost per outcome becomes the only signal, the hardest-to-reach children look like poor value. That is exactly backwards, and it is a design problem we have to solve deliberately.

Context, never cost alone

Remoteness, disability and disadvantage appear as explainable cost drivers, not as marks against a population.

Assumptions on show

Every input is inspectable and contestable. A ministry can challenge a figure and see it rebuilt in the meeting.

Audited from outside

Publishing the method lets people who do not work for us find its faults. A private model cannot be held to account.

- Openness is the governance mechanism, not a nice-to-have.

4 · NEXT STEPS

From our tool to shared infrastructure.

01 Build

Complete the core analytical engine and the tools around it, and publish the method so it can be examined and criticised.

02 Train

Train on real-world data across diverse programmes and contexts, not on a single portfolio.

03 Test in the field

Work with delivery partners to make outcomes genuinely comparable between contexts.

04 Scale

Scale through adoption by governments and global partners, with open benchmarks available to all of them.

PUBLISHED · NOVEMBER 2025

Outcomes AI

Our approach to scaling with AI while keeping human judgement in control: the principles, and three case studies including cost classification and the unified quantitative model.

educationoutcomesfund.org/insight/outcomes-ai

IN PRODUCTION

The OutcomesOS method

A written note on the modelling approach shown today and the next steps set out above. Available shortly.

Please take the link if you would like it when it lands.

TWO THINGS TO TAKE AWAY

Burden towards zero. Method in the open.

- Reduce the administrative burden of designing an outcomes fund as close to zero as possible.
- Build it as a transparent public good the field can iterate on over time.

As usage increases the model improves, which attracts further adoption. The end state is open-access infrastructure that makes evidence-led planning effectively costless, with each investment linked to learning gains.

From Unstructured Evidence to Auditable Insights

How AI-powered document intelligence can strengthen accountability in outcomes-focused partnerships

Munib Qasim Zia · Destillo AI Inc.

Social Outcomes Conference 2026 · Blavatnik School of Government · 3 September

The evidence is buried.

Years of evidence, locked in documents.

Evidence is scattered.

PDFs, Word files, tables, charts and more.

Reading manually takes time.

Sifting through large corpus of documents can take teams months, often close to a year.

Teams often sample.

A few documents are read and the rest go unread.

No portfolio-level view.

Patterns across the whole set stay invisible.

Two teams reading the same documents found 49% and 54% - and agreed on only 28% of it.

What nobody reads, nobody learns from.

Roitblat, Kershaw & Oot (2010), JASIST. Other studies range lower: 20% (Blair & Maron 1985); 38–60% in rapid reviews (Affengruber et al. 2020).

The Workflow: Keeping Verification at the Centre

A two-way road with a roundabout at every stage



Moving forward   Looping back   Revisit earlier decisions

If a stage cannot be verified, the work goes back round - not forward.

e.g. "Employment rose from 42% to 61%." - **there was no baseline. Caught at stage 2.**

Method: Retrieval Augmented Generation - every answer grounded in the retrieved page.

Evals

Two checks on every engagement

FALSE POSITIVES

Did it quote things that were never there?



505 of 611 quotations matched word-for-word. The remaining 106 were flagged and fixed in the second iteration.

FALSE NEGATIVES

Did it miss things that were relevant?

1. **Keyword search across every document**
   NVivo, run over the whole set - not a sample.
2. **Compare against what came back**
   Anything the search found and the system did not.
3. **Manual read of 5–10 documents**
   A person reads end to end, looking for what both missed.

A spot check on recall.

Results

Asian Development Bank: Quality of M&E systems - 225 projects, roughly 750 documents

1 in 3

had nothing credible to measure change from



No credible baseline

Not a number, not a proxy, not even a written description of where things stood.

1 in 5

had no clear plan for how they would measure



No clear plan

The indicator, the source and the method were never specified up front.

Baseline → Inputs → Outputs → Outcomes → Impact

Outcome-based contracts pay for outcomes. Without a starting point, the change cannot be measured.

Scale and Speed

Nuanced questions, answered consistently across the entire corpus

COVERAGE

750 **documents**

Across 225 projects. Every one read - none sampled.

WEEKS TAKEN



- Every answer names its document and page.
- The evidence base stays with the team - and can answer new questions later.

The manual figure is what a comparable ADB review took.

Applicability

Where this has proven valuable, and potential use cases

WORTH IT WHEN

Many pages	A clear framework	Traceable answers
hundreds to thousands	you know what you need	every claim names a page

Taxonomy, framework and judgement stay your own - the architecture and principles are highly transferable.

Munib Qasim Zia · Destillo AI Inc. · munibz@destillo.io

GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB | OXFORD SOC26

Socio-Spatial Modeling for Public Outcomes Solutions

Possibilities in socio-spatial simulation.
Presented by Taso Research.

What is the need this solution is an answer to?

When designing public services…

- How to look beyond population averages?
- How to see where things are going?

A digital twin of a population

250 x 250 m grid



Census data

- 47 females
- 52 males
- 15 higher ed.
- 27 pensioners
- 7 unemployed
- 17 low income
- 10 aged 30–34
- etc.

Algorithmic Modeling



Probabilistic model of population



Female, 32,
higher ed.,
employed…

Male, 29,
unemployed,
low income…

Integrating Spatial, Demographic, and Financial Data

Fusing Multi-Source Data

- Service-related data (e.g. accidents, fires, prevalence of health conditions…)
- Data on service networks
- Costs of the services / Costs of service needs
- Other population related data: statistical data, behavioral data from surveys

Integrating Spatial, Demographic, and Financial Data

Demographics (Who?)

Socio-Spatial Digital Twin

- Population in the neighbourhood
- Probabilities/risks related to the context: e.g. age-related hazards, or evacuation capability, social needs

Spatial Data (Where?)

Service Accessibility

- The difference in service needs between areas and locations
- The difference in service coverage between areas and locations

Financial Data (Cost?)

Socio-Economic Outcomes

- Translating injuries, health-related and social harms into financial impact based on public ledger data

Moving on: Simulations and Scenarios

Simulations

- Pushing the digital twin in time simulates the changes in population
- The changes in the population reflect the changes in the need for services
- Predictive power is controlled

Scenarios

- Service coverage changes –> Probable changes in risks?
- Changes in population characteristics –> Probable changes in service needs?

Framework of trust

Strengths and caveats

- GDPR-by-Design Compliance: Analyses and simulations run strictly on anonymized data, preventing any risk of re-identification
- Auditable & Verifiable Outputs: All statistical models, regressions, and simulations are strictly deterministic, reproducible, and contractually auditable

⚠ **Ethical use: The profiling capabilities must be strictly governed.**

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GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

NOW

Coffee break

15:30 BST

NEXT UP

In conversation with Lisandro Martín

(in person and online)

16:15 BST

Full programme
scan to view the programme and choose your session

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UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

Group Working Room 9

Roundtable

FROM THE SAXON SETTLEMENT TO THE MANOR HOUSE - WHY FUNDING THE SOCIAL ECONOMY IS USP AND NOT SPV


David Neaum
New Philanthropy Capital


Julie Robin
University of Poitiers


Kieron Boyle
Impact Investing Institute


Esmé Clifford Astbury
Office for the Impact Economy


Nigel Ball
Chair


Ruth Stephens
TNLCF


Alex Parker
B Lab UK


Ged Devlin
Key Fund


Jack Wakefield
Social Investment Business

From the Saxon settlement to the manor house...





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BLAVATNIK SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

Executive Seminar Room

Roundtable

DEVELOPING A RESEARCH AGENDA IN THE SPACE BETWEEN FORMAL AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING

Michael Gibson
University of Oxford

Jill Carswell
UK Depatrment for Education

Avishai Benish
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Kristina Patterson
Georgia Southern University

Deanna Malatesta
Indiana University

Ole Horsfeldt
Gorrisen Federspiel

Stéphane Saussier
Sorbonne Business School

Carolyn Heinrich
Vanderbilt University
Chair

David Van Slyke
Syracuse University
Chair

Ole Helby Petersen
Roskilde University
Chair

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NOW

Coffee break

15:30 BST

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In conversation with Lisandro Martín

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Full programme

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GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

Seminar Rooms 1&2

Workshop

MEET THE OUTCOMES FUNDING INNOVATORS

Prateek Garg
Open Source Pharma

Can Atacik
Alethina Impact Investments and Advisory

Julia Greenland
Imara Impact

Lee-Ann Davids
South African Medical Research Council

Tuğçe Söğüt
Impact Investing Advisory Board

Montgomery Simus
The Ocean Cleanup

Andreea Anastasiu
University of Oxford
Chair

Workshop

MEET THE OUTCOMES FUNDING INNOVATORS

Prateek Garg

Open Source Pharma

SEPTEMBER 2026

OUTCOMES-BASED FINANCING FOR GENERIC DRUG REPURPOSING

PRATEEK GARG

OPEN SOURCE PHARMA FOUNDATION

Life of a drug

GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB
BLAVATNIK SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

Drug development is a very lengthy and expensive process

Return on investment, and not need, decides what gets developed



Drug repurposing allows us to skip directly to last-stage of development

An already-approved drug

safety established

~~12–15 yrs~~ → **2–5 yrs**

~~~$2.4bn~~ → **$2–20m**

~ 100× cheaper
~~~

Drug prices fall to near-cost after the patents expire



Financing a repurposing trial is a classic free-rider problem



A classic free-rider problem.


Disease A
Phase 3 (Efficacy) Trial
Disease B
Drug X
$10M
Cost-effectiveness analysis - derived Savings
$10M
$100M
2x
Healthcare payer
(NHS/Insurance Company)
$20M
$20M
Risk investors

Outcomes contract for drug repurposing is atypically clean

Clean outcomes contract

	Typical outcomes contract	Drug repurposing
THE OUTCOME	Proxy indicators, often contested	Regulatory approval. Binary.
VERIFICATION	Bespoke evaluation, costly	Independent regulator, public record
FAILURE MODE	Performance is the main risk	Implementation is already baked-in
PAYMENT TRIGGER	Staged, negotiated, disputable	One event, or nothing is paid



Workshop

MEET THE OUTCOMES FUNDING INNOVATORS

Lee-Ann Davids

South African Medical Research Council

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GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

SOC 2026

A SIB TO IMPROVE MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT TUBERCULOSIS OUTCOMES IN SOUTH AFRICA

LEE-ANN DAVIDS, FAREED ABDULLAH, NEVILENE SLINGERS

OFFICE OF AIDS AND TB RESEARCH, SOUTH AFRICAN MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

PROBLEM

South Africa is a WHO High Burden MDR-TB Country
Incidence = 21 (12 – 30)/100,000 [Global Incidence = 4.8 (4.4 -5.3)/100,000]
Treatment success rate = 71%
~50% of the National TB Programme budget is spent on ~5% of MDR-TB cases
Response had been largely biomedical

Poor outcomes (29%)

- Death
- Lost to follow-up
- Treatment failure

Catastrophic Costs – faced by 64% of patients i.e. >20% of the household income is spent on the patient

Reasons for poor outcomes?
Largely non-biomedical:

- Poor nutrition, low BMI
- Structural factors – e.g. financial burden, homelessness, gender discrimination
- Personal factors – e.g. substance abuse/misuse, attitudes and beliefs, motivation
- Social context – e.g. stigma, social support, community dynamics
- Health services factors – access, staff attitude, organization of care

MDR-TB SIB: THEORY OF CHANGE



Progress to date

Funding sourced for a pilot, to collect cost ingredient data
Partners identified – implementer, technical partner
Protocol submitted for ethics review
In-person partner workshop held
Outcomes funds have been confirmed

Provisional outcome metrics:
Retention in care
Mortality on treatment
Treatment prevention coverage
Treatment success rate
Clinical care composite score
+/-Nutrition coverage

Get involved

(i) Technical partner

Guidance on outcomes – type and number
Considerations when pricing the outcomes
Monitoring and evaluation ideas
How to get the most out of the pilot
Best data parameters to collect during the pilot
Preparing and costing scale up from the outset

(ii) Potential funders

What more would you like to know to get involved?

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Get in touch:

Lee-Ann.Davids@mrc.ac.za

Nevilene.Slingers@mrc.ac.za

https://invest4health.samrc.ac.za/

Outcomes Finance Alliance

OFA'26 SUMMIT

Cape Town
March 25 - 27, 2026

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

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Workshop

MEET THE OUTCOMES FUNDING INNOVATORS

Can Atacik

Alethina Impact Investments and Advisory

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GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

SEPTEMBER 2026

FROM CONCEPT TO CONTRACT

Taking outcomes-based design from ambition to signed deals with South African cities — and leaving the capability inside government.

Can Atacik | Alethina Impact Investments

WE DON'T KNOW WHAT WE DON'T KNOW

AND THAT IS EXACTLY WHERE PUBLIC-SECTOR INNOVATION BEGINS

- Shifting from input-, activity- and expenditure-based planning to outcomes-driven programme design is a genuine mindset leap — and most public officials have never had to make it before.
- Existing procurement, finance and audit rules were not built for outcomes contracting, and at first can feel like blockers rather than tools.
- Outcomes-based design can also look like a threat to public-sector roles: it shifts programme design and delivery onto a social investor or prime contractor, and seemingly reduces their workload to commissioning, verifying outcomes and releasing payments.
- And a single champion inside government cannot carry this change alone — it takes buy-in right across the institution.
- We are seeing the same pattern play out across South African cities: eThekwini (youth homelessness & employment), Cape Town (EPWP skills-to-jobs) and Ekurhuleni/Thembisa (digital & financial inclusion) and in other countries.

AWARENESS FIRST, CITY-LED DESIGN, MARKET-READY BY DEFAULT

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT, FROM DAY ONE — NO SURPRISES

- We start with awareness-raising and capacity building — showing officials, concretely, that outcomes-based design is possible before asking them to commit to it. Examples from comparable countries, and not just UK and US are critical.
- The process is demand-driven: we work with the city to identify the problem THEY want to solve, then help them choose and design the right outcomes structure for it — there is no one-size-fits-all model.
- We engage the full spectrum of officials in parallel — legal, finance, SCM, procurement and auditors — not just a solo champion, so the change is institutionally supported rather than personally dependent. We want to avoid surprises.
- We sound out ideas with investors and outcome funders early in the design process, so what gets built is something the market will actually fund.

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WHAT MAKES THIS POSSIBLE

THE RIGHT PARTNERS, THE RIGHT PRESSURE, THE RIGHT PATIENCE

WHAT WE BRING TO PUSH INNOVATION

- We deliberately build the design capability **inside the state** — officials lead the design, so the know-how stays with them rather than with the adviser.
- We take on genuinely complex problems rather than the easy wins.
- We are patient about design — and we ask our partners for the same patience.
- We build for the market as well as the mandate, so a funded deal is the goal from day one.

WHAT THE CONTEXT GIVES US

- Partners open the door: the World Bank, South Africa's National Treasury and equivalent ministries elsewhere.
- South Africa is genuinely advanced — there is real local experience to build on.
- Pressure to deliver results and do more with less creates real motivation to try something new.

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WHAT WE'RE ASKING OF THIS ROOM

AND IF YOU ASK WHERE THE INNOVATION IS

Innovation is relative. It counts when it solves a real problem: collaborative, demand-driven, wholly owned by the city, and tangible enough to fit local realities. It need not be complex — not innovative finance for its own sake, but structuring aimed at problems that have persisted. That sells.

So what do we solve here? Public money committed to activities that were always accountable for results. We structure around desired outcomes, bring upfront capital to delivery partners who could not otherwise fund the work, and align several departments and multiple delivery partners behind one measurable result — with the design capability left inside the city.

AND SO WHAT WE ASK OF THIS ROOM

- Share your experience of leading shifts like this — what has worked, what has not, and what we could do better.
- Help us turn that into a whole-of-government playbook other cities can pick up.
- Introduce us to other municipalities or public officials open to exploring outcomes-based design.
- Tell us what investors and outcome funders are actually looking for — not only for eThekwini, but in general, we can build around that.

STAY IN TOUCH

Can Atacik

Alethina Impact Investments

can@alethina.com

Scan to connect with me on LinkedIn

It always seems impossible until it's done.

— Nelson Mandela(? ☺)

Workshop

MEET THE OUTCOMES FUNDING INNOVATORS

Tuğçe Söğüt

Impact Investing Advisory Board

SEPTEMBER 2026

Can Sport and Skills Unlock Better Social and Economic Outcomes?

Empowering disabled women and girls through sport and livelihood opportunities in Gaziantep, Türkiye

Tuğçe Söğüt, Secretary General, Impact Investing Advisory Board (EYDK)

PROBLEM

Women and girls with disabilities in Gaziantep face significant barriers to social participation, skills development and livelihood opportunities. These barriers increase their risk of social and economic exclusion.

ACTION and FUNDING

A pre-feasibility study was conducted with early-stage catalytic funding from a UK bilateral programme, providing the initial capital needed to assess and develop the pathway towards an outcomes-based contract.

ALIGNMENT with SDGs

The project's goals closely align with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly those aimed at reducing inequalities, promoting gender equality, and building resilient communities.

THE MODEL WAS SHAPED WITH PEOPLE

LISTEN

117 survey participants, six focus groups, one-to-one interviews, practitioner insights and on-site observation.

CONVENE

77 participants from academia, public institutions, civil society and the private sector examined key barriers and developed practical responses across six thematic commissions.

INSPIRE

Women and girls with disabilities experienced volleyball, handball and wheelchair basketball competitions, helping them engage with sports culture, discover different disciplines and see new possibilities for participation

THE BARRIERS ARE INTERCONNECTED

- 61% face daily barriers
  Mobility and inaccessible infrastructure restrict independence.
- 51% report work barriers
  Employment barriers compound limited independence.
- 45% lack suitable activities
  Access to sport and physical development remains limited.
- 84% want more activities
  Demand spans sport, culture and education.

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WHAT WAS INNOVATIVE?

PRE-FEASIBILITY BEFORE IMPACT BOND DESIGN

Testing outcomes, stakeholder readiness and feasibility before moving into full structuring.

BENEFICIARY-CENTRED DESIGN

Directly involving women and girls with disabilities in identifying barriers, needs and potential solutions.

PARALLEL STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

Engaging beneficiaries, practitioners, public institutions and other stakeholders from the outset.

FIELD-BASED EVIDENCE GENERATION

Using surveys, interviews, focus groups and on-site observation to validate assumptions with first-hand evidence.

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WHAT WAS INNOVATIVE?

PROBLEM-FIRST, FINANCE-SECOND APPROACH

Allowing the financing model to emerge from validated needs and outcomes, rather than fitting the problem into a predetermined financial instrument.

MAINTAINING MOMENTUM DESPITE FINANCING DELAYS

While funding for the next-stage feasibility and impact bond design was pending, local stakeholders continued advancing sport and livelihood activities rather than putting implementation on hold.

CATALYSING PARALLEL LOCAL ACTION

Early stakeholder engagement generated complementary initiatives using other funding sources, including the establishment of production ateliers for sports equipment to create employment opportunities for women and girls with disabilities.

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FROM LOCAL EVIDENCE TO INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION

ALINGMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMMES

Aligned with UNESCO’s Fit for Life programme, strengthening the project’s international relevance and linking the local intervention to a global framework for inclusion, well-being and measurable social impact through sport.

VISIBILITY

Launching the pre-feasibility study at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris gave the model early international exposure, helping position it within global discussions on inclusive sport, social impact and innovative finance.

OUR ASK TO THE SOC26 COMMUNITY

How can we move from a promising pre-feasibility case to a robust outcomes-based contract, with the right outcomes, payers, investors and risk-sharing structure in place?



LET'S CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION

Tuğçe Söğüt, Secretary General
Impact Investing Advisory Board (EYDK)
tugce.sogut@eydk.org | www.eydk.org
+90 532 509 95 57

Workshop

MEET THE OUTCOMES FUNDING INNOVATORS

Monty Simus

The Ocean Cleanup

FROM SOCIAL TO ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOMES

Financing and governing ocean infrastructure through outcomes-based partnerships

Montgomery Simus | The Ocean Cleanup

Social Outcomes Conference 2026 | Oxford

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WHAT IF WE TREATED THIS AS INFRASTRUCTURE?

Not simply plastic removal —
an environmental service delivered over time.

WHAT ARE WE ACTUALLY PAYING FOR?

OUTPUT	ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOME	SYSTEM OUTCOMES	SOCIAL + ECONOMIC VALUE
Plastic intercepted	Plastic leakage reduced	Healthier waterways & coastal ecosystems	Livelihoods • tourism • resilience

DATA MONITORING → LEARNING → POLICY DESIGN → PREVENTION

The measurement question changes as we move from outputs to system-level outcomes.

Attribution becomes harder — but the value created becomes more relevant to governments, communities and outcome funders.

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OUTCOMES DON'T SCALE THEMSELVES. DELIVERY SYSTEMS DO.



CAPITAL
Philanthropy
Govt • DFI

+

AUTHORITY
Permits
Mandates

+

OPERATOR
Tech
Operations

+

COMMUNITY
Local partners
Stewardship

+

DATA / MRV
Evidence
Verification

MEASURABLE OUTCOMES

Repeatable delivery • Comparable measurement • Long-term governance

Technology removes plastic.
Partnerships remove plastic for decades.

FROM PROJECT → OUTCOME → INFRASTRUCTURE

PROJECT

Fund an intervention

→

OUTCOME

Pay for measurable performance

→

INFRASTRUCTURE

Build a repeatable system that delivers over time

ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOMES PARTNERSHIPS

Not a finished model — an emerging proposition for delivering environmental outcomes at scale.

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THE QUESTION FOR THIS ROOM

What would we need to measure — and believe — to pay for the outcome rather than the output?

WHAT?

Which environmental outcome?

WHO?

Who pays and who governs?

EVIDENCE?

How much attribution is enough?

Could environmental outcomes become the next frontier for outcomes-based finance?



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LET'S CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION

Montgomery Simus

Senior Advisor, Blue Finance
The Ocean Cleanup

Environmental infrastructure • outcomes finance • partnerships

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https://www.linkedin.com/in/montysimus

Workshop

MEET THE OUTCOMES FUNDING INNOVATORS

Julia Greenland

Imara Impact

June 2026

IMARA IMPACT

1: The Problem

Demand and supply are out of sync, killing scale opportunities

Large and growing number of risk investors and funders with working capital to deploy

Growing and well-cultivated pipeline of investable projects

Increasing demand for funding and openness to novel solutions

Growing numbers of consultants and intermediaries offering structuring

Improved evidence and tools from GoLab and others

Much slower, inconsistent growth in numbers of outcome payers, both government and donor

“Valley of death” between pilot and scale



Why is it so difficult to be an outcomes funder?

We see massive potential for outcomes-based finance to unlock new resources and make delivery more accountable to users, but mechanisms remain relatively pre-scale and fragmented.

Mechanisms such as impact bonds are **complex**, usually including at least 5 separate actors and multiple parallel contracts.

The number of players and the need to pay IRR to investors increases **transaction costs**, as high as 40% of funding available. Siloes mean verification, performance management and professional services do not benefit from economies of scale.

Negotiations, fundraising, participant education, structuring and contracting can routinely take **years to complete** ahead of services beginning

Outcomes structures require funders and governments to make **changes in their disbursement practices**, rather than adapting to payer systems

2: The Imara Solution

Our hypothesis for Imara Impact

Outcomes can scale, but not one painful transaction at a time.

We believe that a tech enabled, end-to-end solution can appeal to a **new cohort of funders** who want the assurance of **paying for what works**, while radically **reducing transaction costs** and creating a more flexible, responsive and accountable funding environment.

We see a gap for a B2B player, built to meet the needs of potential outcomes funders who are currently held back by suspicion of traditional grants. Imara will play the role of an activist fund manager, deploying capital at scale to maximize returns in the form of girls and women reaching their potential.

Imara's simplified offer

Reduce complexity and improve fit

Provide a single-contract solution aligned with funder and government disbursement and procurement needs. Offer options to recoup capital or reallocate across time and geography

Rationalize Costs

Reduce number of players, provide pre-structured mechanisms, chanel low and no cost risk capital, spread costs of tools and human resources across contracts. Achieve a cost comparable to traditional granting

Leverage Technology

Standardize data collection and verification via the Tiko platform, utilize AI to reduce the costs of verification, fraud prevention, performance management and reporting

Grow the Sector

Re-brand the Outcomes story to appeal to new funders. Build implementer capacity to manage outcomes funding, with a focus on proximate, community-led organizations. Invest in future high potential funders and decision makers

Imara's Tool Box

Sector-agnostic verification at scale

Tiko's founding insight is that user experiences are a series of interactions, and that these interactions can be verified, reviewed and incentivized. The underlying software already serves over a million girls per year, both with and without phones, for reproductive health services, Imara will bring this to millions more across education, economic empowerment and broader health.

AI augmented, transparent performance management

Data visibility, custom built data capture and human expert led performance management is a major cost driver in OBF mechanisms. The platform can serve as a backbone, delivering real time, action oriented dashboards. Imara's additional AI infrastructure will take out much of the time consuming work of reporting, creating decks and identifying trends, so that human performance managers can spread their time across more interventions.

Strong, long lasting service providers

The world is full of organizations that have grown to be excellent at spending and delivering on inputs - to reach Scale, Imara needs a portfolio of organizations that are as driven by outcomes. Imara will invest, both directly and through collaborations with organizational development experts, in a strong network of proximate, nimble organizations ready to be accountable to the changes made in the lives of their users.

NOW

Coffee break

15:30 BST

NEXT UP

In conversation with Lisandro Martín

(in person and online)

16:15 BST

Full programme

scan to view the programme and choose your session

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3 SEPTEMBER

IN CONVERSATION

#SOC26

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In conversation

LISANDRO MARTÍN, DIRECTOR OF THE OUTCOMES DEPARTMENT AT THE WORLD BANK GROUP

Lisandro Martín

Director

Outcomes Department

World Bank Group

Andreea Anastasiu

Executive Director

Government Outcomes Lab

Blavatnik School of Government

University of Oxford

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NOW

10 Years of the GO Lab

(in person only)

17:15 BST

NEXT UP

Networking dinner

(in person only)

17:30 BST

Full programme

scan to view the programme and choose your session

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10 YEARS OF THE GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

CELEBRATING A DECADE OF ENGAGED RESEARCH

“ Governments everywhere will benefit from research, data and training which helps them to focus on outcomes and to work better with the private and not-for-profit sectors

Professor Ngaire Woods
Dean of the Blavatnik School of Government
March 2016

Three roles we've played since 2016

- World-class engaged research to problem-solve
- Trusted learning partner to government
- Global hub for learning and convening





GOVERNMENT OUTCOMES LAB

The GO Lab in numbers

- **36** peer-reviewed papers
- **50+** evaluation & policy reports
- **100+** multimedia resources on our Global Knowledge Hub, with over **173,000** resource downloads
- **2.2m** online interactions with INDIGO Impact Bonds Dataset & **13,500** active users
- **160+** public events
- **10** peer learning groups
- **9** editions of the Social Outcomes Conference
- **3** editions of the Leading Cross Sector Partnerships executive programme
- **1** UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship
- **3** DPhils – congrats Christi, Michael & Maria
- **3** Visiting Professors – thank you Carolyn, Stéphane & welcome Ole!
- **4** secondments x UK government
- **9** cohorts of Visiting Fellows of Practice & **1** OPEN Fellow

THANK YOU!

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Tomorrow morning - Croissants and Collaborations (08:30-10:00)

FIRST FLOOR

01

Primary Prevention as National Infrastructure: Designing Systems for Flourishing, Social Cohesion and Productivity

Location: Group Working Room 5

Facilitators: Bernadette Black (SEED Futures)

02

Public procurement and outcomes funding

Location: Group Working Room 9

Facilitators: Stuart Theobald (Krutham), Agostina Coniglio (Keidos)

03

What works in employment support: Insights from policy & practice

Location: Executive Seminar Room

Facilitators: Tanyah Hameed (Social Finance), Jenny Holmes (South Yorkshire MCA), Nick Butler (UK Department for Education)

BASEMENT FLOOR

04

Unpacking the UK's first Relational Property Development Agreement

Location: Seminar Room 1

Facilitators: Paul Clark (Stories), Sophie White (Aviva), Gavin Barlow (The Albany)

05

Relational Diagnostic: Mapping relational influence in outcomes-focused implementation

Location: Seminar Room 2

Facilitators: Bahana Saikia (UK Department for Work and Pensions)

06

Rethinking Outcomes-Based Partnerships and Incentives in Education Finance

Location: Seminar Room 3

Facilitators: Poornima Kharbanda (GSF), Rob Alhadeff (jackfruit Finance), Caleb Leseine (IDinsight), Joe DiSilvio (EOF), Lucas Tschan (iGravity)

Full programme
scan to view the programme
and choose your session

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Firstname
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THANK YOU FOR LISTENING

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